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JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE

DELAY
Gregory L. Ogden*
Delay in administrative decisionmaking' is a long standing
problem2 that remains unresolved today. In a recent major study of
the federal regulatory agencies, 3 the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs noted that "[m]ost federal regulatory proceedings
are characterized by seemingly interminable delays." 4 Regulatory
agency delay5 is perceived by practitioners before regulatory agencies and administrative law judges within the regulatory agencies as
one of the most serious problems facing those agencies.' Agency
delay is extremely costly to regulated industries and to the public,
both as taxpayer and as consumer.7 According to the Senate Com-8
mittee on Governmental Affairs, undue delay is a serious problem
0
in the agency decisionmaking processes of licensing,9 adjudication,
* Law and Humanities Teaching Fellow and Lecturer-in-Law, Temple University School
of Law, Philadelphia, Pa.; B.A., University of California at Los Angeles, 1970; J. D., University of California at Davis, 1973; LL.M., Temple University, 1978; In the 1978-79 school year,
Mr. Ogden will be Associate Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law.
1. The Administrative Procedure Act [hereinafter cited as APA] defines "agency action." It states: "'agency action' includes the whole or a part of an agency rule, order, license,
5 U.S.C. § 551(13)
sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act . ...
(1976). For purposes of this article, "decisionmaking" will be used in this sense.
2. See J. LANDIS, REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT (1960).
STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION,
3.
VOLUME FOUR, DELAY IN THE REGULATORY PROCESS, S. Doc. No. 72, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977)

[hereinafter cited as RIBICOFF REPORT, VOL. FOUR].
4. RiBICOFF REPORT, VOL. FOUR, supra note 3, at (V).
5. The statistical data is available for the federal regulatory agencies. This article's
conclusions are applicable to delayed decisionmaking in all administrative agencies whether
federal, state, or local.
6. RIBICOFF REPORT, VOL. FOUR, supra note 3, at 1.
7. RIBICOFF REPORT, VOL. FOUR, supra note 3, at 8-10.
8. RIBICOFF REPORT, VOL. FOUR, supra note 3, at 6-7, 26-32.
9. The APA defines licensing as "agency process respecting the grant, renewal, denial,
revocation, suspension, annulment, withdrawal, limitation, amendment, modification, or
conditioning of a license." 5 U.S.C. § 551(9) (1976). "License" is defined in 5 U.S.C. § 551(8)
(1976). The RIBICOFF REPORT, VOL. FOUR, supra note 3, surveyed licensing at the Civil Aeronautics Board [CAB] and at the Interstate Commerce Commission [ICC]. The survey was
based on information obtained by the Administrative Conference of the United States for
formal agency proceedings for fiscal year 1975. The study concluded that licensing proceedings averaged 19 months. RIBICOFF REPORT, VOL. FOUR, supra note 3, at 6-7.
10. The APA defines "adjudication" to be "agency process for the formulation of an
order." 5 U.S.C. § 551(7) (1976). "Order" is defined in 5 U.S.C. § 551(6) (1976). The average
number of days elapsed for adjudicatory proceedings in which there was a decision by an
administrative law judge followed by agency review ranged from 475 days for the CAB to 1,057
for the Federal Communiccations Commission [FCC] in fiscal years 1973 and 1974. RiBICOFF
REPORT, VOL. FOUR, supra note 3, at 27.
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ratemaking," and enforcement. 2 Similarly, notice and comment
rulemaking 3 is sometimes slower than agency adjudication. 4
This article examines judicial efforts to control administrative
delay." It will discuss jurisdictional grounds, substantive standards
(primarily the Administrative Procedure Act," and due process of
law), and judicial remedies for administrative delay. Federal and
state cases will be examined in the sections on substantive standards and remedies. Only federal cases will be discussed in the
jurisdiction section. In all these cases courts have reviewed delayed
decisionmaking by both regulatory and non-regulatory agencies.
11. RiaiCOFF REPORT, VOL. FOUR, supra note 3, at 6-7. The ratemaking process was
studied for the CAB, the Federal Maritime Commission [FMC], the Federal Power Commission [FPC], and the ICC. Ratemaking proceedings averaged 21 months. Id.
12. Id. The enforcement process was studied at the Federal Trade Commission [FTC]
and the Securities Exchange Commission [SEC]. Enforcement proceedings averaged over
three years. Id.
13. The APA defines "rulemaking" to be "agency process for formulating, amending,
or repealing a rule." 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (1966). "Rule" is defined in 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1976).
"Notice and Comment" rulemaking is defined in 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976).
14. See RialcoFF REPORT, VOL. FOUR, supra note 3, at 26-32. It concludes that the
rulemaking process is quicker than adjudication for policy decisions. Id. at 26. For example,
rulemaking proceedings averaged 224 days for the CAB in fiscal year 1974 as contrasted with
475 days for CAB adjudication proceedings. Id. at 27. Similarly, FCC rulemaking proceedings
averaged 383 days in fiscal year 1974 as opposed to 1,057 days for FCC adjudication proceedings. Id. However, in a report by the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, House
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, rulemaking and adjudicatory proceedings
were studied at the Consumer Product Safety Commission [CPSC], the FCC, the FTC, the
ICC, and the SEC. The survey results showed that for the CPSC the average disposal time
for rulemaking proceedings was greater than for adjudicative proceedings: average disposal
time was 16.1 months for rulemaking and 3.3 months for adjudicative proceedings in fiscal
year 1975. Similarly, at the FCC rulemaking proceedings averaged 6.4 months in fiscal year
1975 (down from 14.1 months in fiscal year 1971) while application hearings averaged 4.5
months (down from 10.1 months in fiscal year 1971). STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND
INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 94TH CONG., 2D
SESS., FEDERAL REGULATION AND REGULATORY REFORM 581-85 (Comm. Print, 1976).

15.

On the subject of administrative delay, see: K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE
§ 8.08 (1976); Cramton, Causes and Cures of Administrative Delay, 58 A.B.A.J.
937 (1972); Long, Administrative Proceedings: Their Time and Cost Can Be Cut Down, 49
A.B.A.J. 833 (1963); Gellhorn, Administrative Procedure Reform: Hardy Perennial, 48
A.B.A.J. 243 (1962); Prettyman, Reducing the Delay in Administrative Hearings,39 A.B.A.J.
966 (1953); Kaufman, Have Administrative Agencies Kept Pace With Modern CourtDeveloped Techniques Against Delay?-A Judge's View, 12 AD. L. BULL. 103 (1959-60);
Goldman, Administrative Delay and JudicialRelief, 66 MICH. L. REv. 1423 (1968); Rothman,
Four Ways to Reduce Administrative Delay, 28 TENN. L. REV. 332 (1961); Freedman, The
Uses and Limits of Remand in Administrative Law: Staleness of the Record, 115 U. PA. L.
REV. 145 (1966); Comment, Judicial Control of Administrative Inaction: Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelhaus, 57 VA. L. REv. 676 (1971); Note, JudicialAcceleration of the
Administrative Process: The Right to Relief From Unduly Protracted Proceedings,72 YALE
L. J. 574 (1963).
16. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (1976).
SEVENTIES,
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I.

JUDICIAL CONTROL: AN INTRODUCTION

Courts have been asked to provide relief to parties harmed by
delayed administrative decisions for over fifty years. As far back as
1926, in Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co.," the United States
Supreme Court affirmed the granting of equitable relief by a United
States district court to Bell Telephone Company to remedy a three
year delay by the Illinois Public Utilities Commission in deciding
whether requested rate increases were to be granted. More recent
cases have challenged delayed decisionmaking by federal regulatory
5
agencies. For example, in FederalPower Commission v. Hunt,' the
United States Supreme Court acknowledged delayed decisionmaking by the Federal Power Commission in discussing the claims of the
natural gas producers:
[tihat the condition of the Commission's docket transposes for all
practical matters temporary certificates into permanent ones. This
claim arises due to the delays incident to the issuance of a permanent
certificate. We spoke of the "nigh interminable" delay in § 5 proceedings in Atlantic Refining Co. v.Public Service Comm., supra, [360
U.S.] at 389. There delay operated against the consumer. Here it
operates against the producer. The Commission has been making
efforts in this regard, through the establishment of guidelines for
determining initial prices and other administrative devices. However,
we again call to its attention the dangers inherent in the accumulation of a large backlog of cases with its accompanying irreparable
injury to the parties. Moreover, consumers may become directly affected thereby through the reluctance of producers to enter the interstate markets because of the long delay incident to permanent certification. Procedures must be worked out, not only to clear up this
docket congestion, but also, to maintain a reasonably clear current
9
docket so that hearings may be had without inordinate delay.

More recently, courts have criticized the Federal Communications
Commission for delayed decisionmaking in license renewal proceed2
ings 2Oand application proceedings.
17. 270 U.S. 587 (1926).
18. 376 U.S. 515 (1964). In Hunt, the United States Supreme Court upheld an FPC
grant of natural gas sale temporary certificates conditioned on the disallowance of gas sale
price increases while the decision on granting permanent certificates was pending. In so doing,
the Court reversed a decision of the court of appeals invalidating that condition. 376 U.S. at
516-17.
19. 376 U.S. at 526-27 (citation omitted).
20. Fidelity Television, Inc. v. FCC, 502 F.2d 443 (D.C. Cir. 1974). In Fidelity the court
noted with displeasure that "[tihe history of the administrative proceeding out of which this
case arises is one of inordinate delay which has considerably tried this court's patience." 502
F.2d at 444. The FCC delayed eight years in deciding whether Fidelity Television, Inc. should
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Although the courts must have the assistance of the legislative
and the executive branches of government to control delayed administrative decisionmaking,2 they do have an important role in
controlling delay and in remedying abuses caused by delayed decisionmaking.?1 The discussion of the judicial role will be divided into
sections on jurisdiction and barriers to judicial review, substantive
standards, and remedies courts have articulated to control delayed
decisionmaking.
II.

JURISDICTION

A court must have subject matter jurisdiction to review a claim
that administrative decisionmaking has been unduly delayed. Federal court jurisdiction to review claims of undue administrative
delay must be based on some other ground than the Administrative
Procedure Act.24 As a result of the Califano v. Sanders decision,. a
discussion of other grounds for federal subject matter jurisdiction of
delay claims is required. This section will examine federal question
jurisdiction, 2 mandamus,2 7 review of agency inaction under a specific statute, and appellate review jurisdiction based on an agency
order.
The Administrative Procedure Act does not provide an independent ground for subject matter jurisdiction.28 In Sanders, an
applicant for social security disability benefits challenged a Social
be granted a television station license or whether a competing station's license for the same
channel should be renewed. 502 F.2d at 444.
21. Lebanon Valley Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 503 F.2d 196 (D.C. Cir. 1974). In this case, the
court indicated its irritation with the slow pace of an FCC proceeding on Lebanon Valley
Radio, Inc.'s application "for a construction permit for a new broadcast station." 503 F.2d
at 197. The proceeding started in March, 1965. In reversing and remanding the case to the
FCC, the court stated "[wle presume the Commission will proceed expeditiously so that this
proceeding may reach a final conclusion before it enters its second decade." 503 F.2d at 201.
22. In NLRB v. Mastro Plastics Corp., 354 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1965), Chief Judge Lumbard called for legislative and executive action to reduce delays in National Labor Relations
Board [NLRB back pay cases. He noted that delays in Mastro Plastics Corp. were caused
by personnel shortages. More generally, he stated that the nature of back pay awards results
in a lengthy decisionmaking process. 354 F.2d at 180-81.
23. In Chicago & E. Ill. R.R. v. United States, 375 U.S. 150 (1963), Mr. Justice Black
(in a dissenting opinion) charged that the ICC "has used procedural delaying devices to deny
barge lines their inherent advantage over railroads" in carriage rates. 375 U.S. at 151. He also
noted that courts "have had to protect inland barge lines from Commission action" that
denied such advantages. Id. at 151.
24. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (1976); Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977).
25. 430 U.S. 99 (1977).
26. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970), as amended by Act of Oct. 27, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-544,
90 Stat. 2721.
27. 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1970).
28. 430 U.S. 99 (1977).
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Security Administration decision not to reopen his previously denied claim for benefits. He based jurisdiction for his challenge on
section 205(g) of the Social Security Act.2 The United States district court held that it did not have section 205(g) jurisdiction to
review that decision.30 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
reversing the district court, found "an independent grant of subject
matter jurisdiction without regard to the amount in controversy
. ." in section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act.' In reversing the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the United States
Supreme Court concluded that the Administrative Procedure Act,
section ten,3 2 is not an independent ground of federal subject matter
jurisdiction.Y The Sanders decision is important in this context
because the Administrative Procedure Act provides both substantive standards prohibiting unreasonable delay by administrative
agencies 34 and judicial power to remedy unreasonably delayed
agency action.3 5 Due to the Sanders decision, however, subject matter jurisdiction to review unreasonable delay claims must be found
3
on other grounds. 6
The Sanders Court stated that federal question jurisdiction is
available, except when prohibited by a specific statute, to review
3
As part
agency action in lieu of the Administrative Procedure Act7.
of the rationale for its holding, the Court interpreted amendments
to the federal question jurisdiction statute, section 1331(a),'3 and
stated: "The obvious effect of this modification, subject only to
29. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1973).
30. 430 U.S. at 103-04.
31. Id. quoting from the opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 522
F.2d 1167, 1169 (7th Cir. 1975).
32. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (1976).
33. 430 U.S. at 103-04.
34. 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (1976) states: "With due regard for the convenience and necessity
of the parties or their representatives and within a reasonable time, each agency shall proceed
to conclude a matter presented to it." 5 U.S.C. § 558(c) (1976) states: "When application is
made for a license required by law, the agency, with due regard for the rights and privileges
of all the interested parties or adversely affected persons and within a reasonable time, shall
set and complete proceedings . . . and shall make its decision."
35. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976) states: "[Tihe reviewing court shall-(1) compel agency
"
action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed ..
36. The Sanders Court cited, as a case contrary to its holding, Deering Milliken, Inc.
v. Johnston, 295 F.2d 856 (4th Cir. 1961). 430 U.S. at 104 n.4. In Deering Milliken, Inc. the
court reviewed NLRB action, claimed to be unreasonably delayed in violation of the APA
standards, and held that the APA provides courts with jurisdiction to review claims of unreasonably delayed agency action.
37. 430 U.S. at 105.
38. Pub. L. No. 94-544, 90 Stat. 2721 (1976). These amendments eliminated the
"amount-in-controversy" requirement for suits against the United States government and
against agencies, officers, and employees of the United States government. 430 U.S. at 105.
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preclusion-of-review statutes created or retained by Congress, is to
confer jurisdiction on federal courts to review agency action regardless of whether the APA of its own force may serve as a jurisdictional
predicate. 319 Thus courts can review claims that agency action has
been unduly delayed under section 1331 jurisdiction unless a specific statute precludes review of the particular type of agency action.40 Even with a "preclusion-of-review statute," however, a court
probably has jurisdiction to determine a constitutional claim that
due process of law is violated" by unreasonably delayed agency
action.2
Federal mandamus 43 provides another ground of subject matter
jurisdiction for judicial review of unreasonably delayed agency action.4 In White v. Mathews, applicants for social security disability
benefits brought a class action to obtain judicial relief from the
failure of the Social Security Administration to promptly hear and
decide their appeals of the Secretary's decision to deny their applications for benefits.4" The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
affirmed the district court's finding that federal mandamus provided jurisdiction for judicial review" of the plaintiff's claim that
their social security disability hearings were unreasonably delayed.47
The court of appeals reasoned that mandamus is appropriate be39. 430 U.S. at 105.
40. The Sanders Court went on to conclude that § 205(g) of the Social Security Act did
not provide jurisdiction to review this decision because there was "no final decision of the
Secretary made after a hearing." 430 U.S. at 108.
41. See discussion of unduly delayed agency action as a due process violation in text
accompanying notes 133-36 infra.
42. The Sanders Court distinguished, concerning § 205(g) jurisdiction, the cases of
Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975), and Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). In
both those cases review under § 205(g) was allowed even though there was no decision by the
Secretary following a hearing because both cases contained constitutional challenges to the
decision of the Social Security Administration which would have been foreclosed by the
preclusion of § 1331 jurisdiction contained in § 205(h) (42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (1973)) of the Social
Security Act. The Sanders Court distinguished those cases and stated that "[clonstitutional
questions obviously are unsuited to resolution in administrative hearing procedures and,
therefore, access to the courts is essential to the decision of such questions." 430 U.S. at 109.
Salfi and Mathews "merely adhered to the well established principle that when constitutional
questions are in issue, the availability of judicial review is presumed." Id.
43. 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1970).
44. White v. Mathews, 559 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1977). Accord, Caswell v. Califano, 435
F.Supp. 127 (N.D. Me. 1977); Blakenship v. Mathews, No. C 75-0185 L(A) (W.D. Ky. May
6, 1976); Sturgill v. Mathews, No. 75-288 (E.D. Ky. September 17, 1975); Barnett v. Weinberger, No. 74-270 (D. Vt. May 6, 1975).
45. 559 F.2d at 855.
46. See Byse & Fiocca, Section 1361 of the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962 and
"Nonstatutory" Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action, 81 HARV. L. REv. 308
(1967).
47. 559 F.2d at 856.
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cause the Secretary is required by the Social Security Act to conduct hearings within a reasonable time and because the Secretary
does not have "discretion to deny a reasonable opportunity for a
hearing."" Since it affirmed the district court finding that mandamus was appropriate, the court of appeals in White declined to
decide whether either federal question jurisdiction under section
0
136111 or section 205(g) of the Social Security Act provide jurisdictional grounds for judicial review of claims of unreasonably delayed
hearings."
Jurisdiction to review undue delay claims can also be based on
statutes establishing an agency's mandate. In Environmental De48. Id. The district court in White v. Mathews, 434 F. Supp. 1252 (D. Conn. 1976),
analyzed the mandamus issue as to unreasonably delayed hearings. It stated the three basic
requirements of mandamus: " '(1) a clear right in the plaintiff to the relief sought; (2) a
plainly denied and preemptory duty on the part of the defendant to do the act in question;
and (3) no other adequate remedy available.' Lovallo v. Froehlke, 468 F.2d 340, 343 (2d Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S.. 918 (1973)." 434 F. Supp. at 1258. Applying that test, the
district court found plaintiff had "a clear right to the hearing he seeks .... " Id. at 1259,
citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(b) (1973) and 20 C.F.R. § 404.917 (1976). The district court also found
the Secretary had a mandatory duty "to perform within a reasonable time and not permit
unreasonable delay of administrative action." Id. at 1259, citing the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 555(b)
(1976) and Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Johnston, 295 F.2d 856, 860-61 (4th Cir. 1961). Finally,
the court concluded that no other adequate remedy was available because plaintiff had not
received a prompt hearing, a fact uncontested by the Secretary. Id. at 1259. As to the final
point, the court in Caswell v. Califano, 435 F. Supp. 127 (N.D. Me. 1977), held, citing the
district court opinion in White, that the alternative of protesting to the Secretary regarding
the lack of promptness in hearing and deciding cases is "unrealistic" because the Secretary
"is already acutely aware of the existing backlog and delays prior to hearing." 435 F. Supp.
at 132. Caswell was also a challenge to delayed Social Security disability hearings on very
similar grounds to White.
49. 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1970).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1973). In Caswell v. Califano, 435 F. Supp. 127 (N.D. Me. 1977),
the court went on to find, in addition to federal mandamus, that section 405(g) of the Social
Security Act provides jurisdiction for a claim that administrative hearings have been unreasonably delayed in violation of plaintiffs statutory and constitutional rights to a hearing. The
court used the United States Supreme Court's analysis in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319
(1976), to conclude that once an application is filed with the Secretary and there has been
an initial decision, administrative action is sufficiently final for judicial review and plaintiffs
are not required to exhaust administrative remedies to have judicial review of the constitutional claim under section 405(g) jurisdiction. 435 F. Supp. at 132-33.
51. 559 F.2d at 856. In Citizens Ass'n of Georgetown, Inc. v. Washington, 291 A.2d 699
(D.C. Ct. App. 1972), the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that mandamus is not
an appropriate ground of jurisdiction to compel the District of Columbia Zoning Commission
to perform quasi-legislative acts claimed to be unduly delayed by a citizen's group interested
in rehabilitation of the Georgetown Waterfront area. Id. at 705. The court stated that the
District of Columbia Administrative Procedure Act required that the action to be reviewed
must be a contested case, defined as adjudicative action, for the court to have jurisdiction to
review the case. Id. at 703-05. Accord, Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Mayor-Comm'r
of D.C. 317 A.2d 515 (D.C. Ct. App. 1974) (contested case requirement of D.C. APA precludes
review of petitioner's claim that the local government has failed to act to correct an alleged
serious "air pollution emergency").
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2 petitioners
fense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin,1
sued to compel the Secretary of Agriculture to suspend the registration of DDT as a
"misbranded economic poison" under the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act. 3 Prior to filing suit, petitioners had
requested, inter alia, that the Secretary issue suspension notices,
but he did not act on the suspension petition filed by petitioners. 5'
The court of appeals framed the issue in the following manner by
stating: "This case requires the court to consider under what circumstgnces there may be a judicial remedy for the failure of an
administrative agency to act promptly, and what form that remedy
may take."55 The court of appeals denied the government's motion
to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds and "remanded [the case] to
the Secretary to provide this court with the record necessary for
meaningful appellate review.""6 In deciding that it had jurisdiction
to review this claim, the court noted that the availability of mandamus jurisdiction does not preclude "statutory appellate review of
the failure to act, when exigent circumstances render it equivalent
to a final denial of petitioners' request."5 7 The court treated the
Secretary's delayed suspension decision as a denial of the requested
suspension sufficient to trigger appellate review of that action under
the governing statute, the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act.5"
Similarly, the Hill-Burton Act 9 provided jurisdiction for a suit
against the Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare (hereinafter cited as HEW) as well as local and state offi52. 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
53. 7 U.S.C. § 136 (1976).
54. 428 F.2d at 1095-96.
55. Id. at 1095.
56. Id. at 1096.
57. Id. at 1098. The court at 1099 n.29 cites and discusses § 706, APA in support of
reviewability of administrative inaction. To the extent that reviewability is premised in § 706
as a jurisdictional ground, Hardin is overruled by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977).
58. 428 F.2d at 1099. Judicial review of the validity of orders is provided in 7 U.S.C. §
1356(d) (1964). Similarly, in Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584
(D.C. Cir. 1971), the petitioners sued to compel issuance of both notices of suspension and
notices of cancellation as to certan uses of DDT pursuant to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act [FIFRA] which they claimed the Secretary of the Environmental
Protection Agency had unreasonably delayed in issuing. Id. at 588. The court concluded that
it had jurisdiction as to the cancellation issue "to entertain a request for relief in the form of
an order directing the Secretary to act in accordance with FIFRA." Id. at 593. The court
reasoned that it had this mandamus-like power under 7 U.S.C. § 1356(d)(1964) in order to
protect its appellate jurisdiction from never being perfected because of indefinite delay by
the Secretary in issuing a reviewable order. Id. On the issue or reviewability of failures to
suspend under FIFRA, see also Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 465 F.2d 528 (D.C.
Cir. 1972).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 291 (1970, Supp. V 1975).
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cials to compel the opening of a hospital, in Poirrier v. St. James
ParishPolice Jury.6" Plaintiffs in Poirriersought to compel the Secretary to seek repayment to HEW of Hill-Burton moneys used by
61
state and local officials to construct the hospital. Denying a government motion to dismiss the action, the court concluded that
plaintiffs had stated "a claim for judicial review of administrative
action-in this case administrative inaction-on the ground that
the Secretary has abused the discretion given him by the HillBurton Act." 62 In so holding, the court stated that "administrative
discretion is not a license for lethargy .. *"63 The court went on to
conclude that the Secretary must "at some point . . . seek a refund
of the Hill-Burton grant unless he makes the affirmative determination under the Act that such action is not appropriate. 42 U.S.C. §
291(i)." 6 4 Thus the Hill-Burton Act can be used as the basis of a
court's jurisdiction to review delayed action by the HEW Secretary.
A court's appellate jurisdiction to review agency orders provides
another jurisdictional ground for review of claims that agency action
has been unreasonably delayed. However, this is an effective ground
only when litigants can afford to wait until the agency issues some
order reviewable in the normal appellate process or until the administrative process has run its course completely. When litigants cannot afford to wait until an agency order is issued, they must establish that agency proceedings are sufficiently final for the case to be
ripe for judicial review. They must also establish standing to assert
an unreasonable delay claim before a reviewing court. Finally, they
must either exhaust adequate administrative remedies or prove that
those remedies are unavailable or inadequate.
60. 372 F. Supp. 1021 (E.D. La. 1974), aff'd, 531 F.2d 316 (5th Cir. 1976). The hospital
at 1022.
remained "vacant and unused" for eighteen months after it was built. 372 F. Supp.
61. Id.
of
62. Id. at 1023. However, the Poirriercourt cites and discusses § 706 as supportive
extent
the
To
n.3.
1024
at
Supp.
F.
372
at
judicial reviewability of administrative inaction
Califano
reviewability is premised in § 706 as a jurisdictional ground, Poirrieris overruled by
v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977).
63. Id.
64. Id. The Poirriercourt also denied the government's motion for summary judgment
the granted
that the Secretary abused his discretion under the Act by neither suing to recover
funds were
the
if
that,
condition
contract
a
of
breach
for
grantees
fund
funds nor suing the
that
granted, then the hospital would be constructed and opened. The court finally noted
the
for
justification
sufficient
legally
a
not
is
defense,
a
as
raised
insufficient personnel,
Secretary's failure to pursue either course of action. 372 F. Supp. at 1025-26.
agency
65. Nader v. FCC, 520 F.2d 182 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (claim of unreasonably delayed
approving
action on a related issue raised when court of appeals reviewed FCC decision
U.S. 911
AT&T rate increase); Irish v. SEC, 367 F.2d 637 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386
SEC
reviewed
appeals
of
court
when
raised
action
agency
(1967) (claim of unduly delayed
order revoking petitioner's broker and dealer registration).
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In Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin," the court
held, in denying a government motion to dismiss, that the Environmental Defense Fund had standing to litigate the claim that the
Secretary of Agriculture had unreasonably delayed the action of
issuing DDT suspension notices. 7 Similarly, the court rejected the
government's claim that because the Secretary had neither granted
nor denied the request to issue suspension notices, there was no final
order ripe for judicial review." The court found a final order ripe for
review by holding that "administrative inaction is the equivalent of
an order denying relief."6 9 Although the court warned that "relief
delayed is not always equivalent to relief denied,"7 0 it concluded
that "when administrative inaction has precisely the same impact
on the rights of the parties as denial of relief, an agency cannot
preclude judicial review by casting its decision in the form of inaction rather than in the form of an order denying relief."'" Thus
delayed action is ripe for judicial review if the delay both causes
irreparable harm as alleged by petitioners in Hardin and has the
effect of a denial of the requested action.
The requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies for
court review of agency action does not bar judicial review of a claim
66. 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
67. Id. at 1096-97. Accord, Poirrier v. St. James Parish Police Jury, 372 F. Supp.
1021,
1024 (E.D. La. 1974), afJ'd, 531 F.2d 316 (5th Cir. 1976) (standing of a group of local
residents
to raise the issue of unduly delayed action by the HEW Secretary).
68. 428 F.2d at 1098.
69. Id. at 1099. The court concluded that the case was ripe and therefore action
delayed
is action denied because: 1) the Secretary's denial of a suspension petition would
be sufficiently ripe for review; 2) "[n]o subsequent action can sharpen the controversy
arising from
a decision by the Secretary that the evidence submitted by petitioners does not
compel
suspension or cancellation of the registration of DDT"; and 3) "[in light of
the urgent
character of petitioner's claim, and the allegation that delay itself inflicts irreparable
injury,
the controversy is as ripe for judicial consideration as it can never be." Id. at 1098.
Regarding
the third reason, the court went on to-state:
[Tihe suspension power is designed to protect the public from an "imminent
hazard", if petitioners are right in their claim that DDT presents a hazard sufficient
to warrant suspension, then even a temporary refusal to suspend results in irreparable
injury on a massive scale. The controversy over interim relief is ripe for judicial resolution, because the Secretary's inaction results in a final disposition of such rights as
the
petitioners and the public may have to interim relief.
428 F.2d at 1099.
70. Id. at 1099.
71. Id. In Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d.584 (D.C.
Cir.
1971), the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found that the
Secretary's
inaction in neither granting nor denying petitioner's request to issue notices of
cancellation
for some uses of DDT was a final order ripe for review because: 1) denying the
requested
issuance would be reviewable as a final order; 2) indefinitely delaying the decision
to issue
or not issue notices would prevent judicial review by the court; and 3) "the Secretary's
own
findings with respect to DDT compel him to issue cancellation notices." 439 F.2d
at 592-93.
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that agency action has been unduly delayed. In7 2Latvian State Cargo
& PassengerSteamship Line v. United States, the court held that
a shipowner, whose ship was "requisitioned" by the United States
Maritime Commission (on June 1, 1942), eight years prior to suit,
could sue in the Court of Claims for just compensation even though
the owner failed to exhaust administrative remedies with the Commission. Since the Commission delayed for eight years without explaining why it had not determined or paid compensation for the
ship, the court allowed the shipowner to sue directly in the Court
of Claims so that its statutory right to compensation would not be
73
denied by Commission delay. In addition, in Southeastern Oil, Inc.
74 plaintiff's suit to recover moneys withheld by the
v. United States
United States government was not barred by failure to exhaust an
administrative remedy that was inadequate because of administrative delay.7"
Although inadequate administrative remedies do not have to be
exhausted, an unreasonable delay claim must at least be raised with
the administrative agency to preserve that claim for judicial review.
76
In Gearhart & Otis, Inc. v. SEC, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit denied the petitioner's claim that an
SEC action revoking its broker's registration was unreasonably de72. 88 F. Supp. 290 (Ct. Cl. 1950).
73. Id. at 292. For an insightful analysis of unreasonably delayed agency action as a
defense to an exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement for review of a demonstration permit statute as a prior restraint on first amendment rights see Graham, Action and
Exhaustion: The Problem of Denial of ConstitutionalDefense Because of Failure to Exhaust
Remedies, 44 WASH. L. REV. 547, at 565-76 (1969).
74. 115 F. Supp. 198 (Ct. Cl. 1953).
75. Id. at 201. The plaintiffs' suit was not barred according to the court because:
[tihe plaintiff having appealed to the head of the department and the head of the
department having failed for more than two years to indicate whether he would or
would not take jurisdiction of the appeal, the plaintiff was justified in regarding the
administrative appeal procedure as inadequate and in filing its suit in this court.
Having filed its suit, it was not required to abandon that suit and resume the administrative procedure.
Id. Accord, citing principal case, Sunshine Publishing Co. v. Summerfield, 184 F. Supp. 767,
cert. denied, 349 U.S. 921 (1955). (15 month delay by Post Office in processing second-class
permit application by nudist magazine). Accord, Caswell v. Califano, 435 F. Supp. 127 (N.D.
Me. 1977) as to the inadequacy of administrative remedies when the claim is unduly delayed
agency action. The court in Caswell reasoned in holding that the exhaustion requirement does
not preclude court review of plaintiff's claim under section 405(g) that:
administhe very essence of plaintiffs' claim in this case is that finality within the
trative system cannot be achieved because of the violation of their statutory and
constitutional right to be heard. It would indeed be ironic if the very delay now under
attack, which prevents exhaustion of administrative remedies through no fault of
plaintiffs, constitutes a barrier to this Court's jurisdiction under Section 405(g).
Id. at 133.
76. 348 F.2d 798 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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layed because petitioners failed to raise the claim before the SEC
first as required by section 25(a) of the Securities Exchange Act."
Similarly, judicial relief to expedite resolution of an agency proceeding that is unreasonably delayed should be requested promptly. 71
Class actions can be used to obtain judicial review of unreasonable delay claims even though the agency attempts to moot the class
representative's case by acting promptly on his or her own claim.
In White v. Mathews, 79 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
rejected the HEW Secretary's claim that the case was moot because
the representative plaintiff obtained the hearing he wanted before
the class was certified. 0 The court affirmed the district court's certification of the class under rule 23(a)(2)5 ' and allowed relation back
of the certification to the time when the representative plaintiff's
claim of an unreasonably delayed hearing was still live."
In conclusion, judicial review of claims that administrative action is unreasonably delayed can be based on federal question jurisdiction, federal mandamus, specific statutes such as the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act or the Hill-Burton Act,
and on appellate jurisdiction. Finally, ripeness, standing, and exhaustion do not necessarily prevent judicial review when delayed
decisionmaking is equivalent to denied action. Mootness can be
avoided by using class litigation to ensure review of the delayed
action even though the agency promptly acts on the class representative's claim."
77. Id. at 800-01. 15 U.S.C. § 784(a) (1971).
78. Irish v. SEC, 367 F.2d 637 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S.
911 (1967). In Irish,
petitioner challenged SEC revocation of his broker-dealer registration
because the revocation
proceedings were unreasonably delayed. The court denied his delay
claim, in part, because
he failed to object to a two year hiatus in the revocation proceedings
until the SEC sought to
reactivate the proceedings. According to the court, he should have petitioned
for judicial relief
to compel a prompt determination in the revocation action before the
SEC sought to restart
the proceedings. 367 F.2d at 638-39.
79. 559 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1977).
80. Id. at 857. The court rejected the mootness claim, in part, to
prevent the agency
from avoiding judicial review by providing the requested relief to the
named plaintiff when
the claim that hearings are unreasonably delayed is still at issue for
class members. Id.; but
see Callier v. Hill, 326 F. Supp. 669 (W.D. Mo. 1970) (the court
dismissed as moot the
unreasonable delay claim of a named plaintiff representative of an alleged
but certified class
whose ADC fair hearing was eventually held even though not within
the required sixty days
from the date of the request).
81. FED. R. Civ. Pao. 23(a)(2) (1972). Certification under rule 23(a)(2)
is proper according to the court of appeals because the legal and factual issues are
sufficiently similar when
"plaintiffs all seek social security disability benfits through
the identical administrative
process, all have requested hearings after initial adverse rulings, and
all have endured long
delays before hearing." 559 F.2d at 858.
82. Id. at 857.
83. For a discussion of the justiciability of claims that agency action
has been delayed
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III.
A.

SUBSTANTIVE STANDARDS

Introduction

Once jurisdiction is established, a court must find a substantive
standard both to define "unreasonable delay" and to proscribe
agency action that is so delayed. Courts have used the Administrative Procedure Act, 4 specific statutes that mandate the agency's
duties, and the constitutional requirements of the due process
clause to define and proscribe unreasonably delayed agency action.
Regardless of the standard used, courts have had to define what
is a delayed or abnormal time period for a particular administrative
agency action. Courts have also had to define when a delay is unreasonable. Courts have then had to ascertain whether the party objecting has been prejudiced by the delayed action. Finally, courts
have had to determine what justifications by agencies for delayed
action are legally sufficient excuses precluding judicial relief for the
party whose claim is delayed.
The Administrative ProcedureAct
Federal administrative agencies are required by the Administrative Procedure Act to complete actions before those agencies
"within a reasonable time . . . ."I' Courts are empowered by the
same Act to "compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.""6 Litigants must prove that the time period during which the agency has delayed its action is7an abnormal or unreasonable one. In FTC v. J. Weingarten, Inc., the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit reversed a district court injunctive order
granted to prohibit the Federal Trade Commission from remanding
8
a section five action" under the Federal Trade Commission Act
against Weingarten to a FTC hearing examiner three years after the
proceeding began. 9 Weingarten claimed the remand violated the
Administrative Procedure Act's requirement of reasonably timely
agency action. The court of appeals rejected that claim and held
that unreasonable delay cannot be established by the mere passage
of time, even for more than three years. In so holding, the court

B.

for a variety of reasons, see Goldman, Administrative Delay and JudicialRelief, 66MICH. L.
REV. 1423 (1968).
84. 5 U.S.C. § 551-706 (1976).
85. 5 U.S.C. §§ 555(b), 558(c) (1976).
86. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (1976).
87. 336 F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 908 (1965).
88. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
89. 336 F.2d at 689-91.
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noted that "[aibsent proof of the normal time necessary to dispose
of a similar proceeding" an unreasonable delay claim cannot
be
established."
A statutory time limit on agency action can be used to prove
the required normal time period. 9 Without such a statutory time
limit,"2 statements of agency representatives9 3 or measurements
of
the usual time for a challenged proceeding94 can also be used
to
prove the requisite time period.95 In the absence of any proof
of a
90. Id. at 691. The Weingarten court went on to state "[s]o far
as this record shows,
this case . . . proceeded at a rate comparable to that normally
experienced in cases of this
kind ....
" Accord, citing principal case, Kent v. Hardin, 425 F.2d 1346 (5th
Cir. 1970) (14month delay by USDA hearing examiner in issuing decision suspending
for 90 days petitioner's license to trade in the commodities futures markets does
not violate APA "reasonable
dispatch" standard without proof of the normal time for such decisions
to be issued).
91. Caswell v. Califano, 435 F. Supp. 127 (N.D. Me. 1977). In Caswell,
the court defined
a reasonable time for the holding of social security disability hearings
to be 90 days from the
date the hearing is requested. This definition was based, in
part, on 90-day time periods
stated in the Social Security Act § 16 31(c)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(2)
(Supp. V 1975) to decide
supplemental security income cases when the presence of a disability
is not questioned, and
stated in regulations at 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a)(16) (1976) to decide
claims at the state agency
under the former aid to the totally disabled program. 435 F. Supp.
at 134-35.
92. THE RIBICOFF REPORT, VOL. FOUR, supra note 3, at 145-47, recommends
that agencies
set, publish, and enforce deadlines for the accomplishment in a
timely manner of the agencies' business. The report recommends against congressionally determined
time limits preferring to require the agencies to set their own time limits. In contrast,
Congress has chosen to
handle the analogous problem of delayed criminal adjudication
by enacting specific time
limits for the processing of federal criminal cases in the Speedy
Trial Act of 1974, Pub. L.
No. 93-619, 88 Stat. 2076, (codified in 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174
(Supp. V 1975)). Section
3161(b) requires the filing of an information or indictment within
thirty days from the date
the person is arrested or served with a summons. See Levy v.
United States, 477 F.2d 916
(6th Cir. 1973). In Levy, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
vacated a district court
order granting injunctive relief. The order prevented the United
States from disqualifying a
food stamp retailer from participating in the food stamp program
because of a two-year delay
in beginning disqualification proceedings after the alleged disqualifying
acts had occurred.
The court vacated the order, in part, because the statute did not
set time limits on disqualification investigations.
93. White v. Mathews, 559 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1977). In White,
the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit quoted testimony before Congress of Social Security
Administration Commissioner Cardwell in which he indicated that social security
disability hearings could be
disposed of within 90 days of the request for hearing. Id. at 860
n.10. The court used that
testimony to support its conclusion that the district court's order
imposing a time schedule
for the disposition of social security hearings within 120 to 180 days
was not inconsistent with
congressional intent expressed in the Social Security Act. Id.
at 860. Accord, Caswell v.
Califano, 435 F. Supp. 127 (N.D. Me. 1977), in which the district
court supported its finding
that 90 days from date of request was a reasonable time period for
the scheduling of disability
hearings, in part, on the testimony of the Secretary that "90
days is the optimum median
elapsed time from request to scheduled hearing." 435 F. Supp.
at 135.
94. See Clark and Merryman, Measuring the Durationof Judicial
and Administrative
Proceedings,75 MICH. L. REV. 89 (1976); and Doane, Measuring
the Durationof Judicialand
Administrative Proceedings:A Comment, 75 MICH. L. REV. 100
(1976).
95. See Caswell v. Califano, 435 F. Supp. 127, 135 (N.D.
Me. 1977), in which the
Secretary indicates "the optimum median elapsed time" for scheduling
of disability hearings
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normal time period, unreasonable delay can also be found when
action is not completed because the agency exhibits lethargy, sloth,
when the
inertia, or a dilatory attitude." It can also be found
7
long.
elapsed time for agency actions is egregiously
When a specific agency statute does not set a time limit for the
completion of an action or does not otherwise prohibit unreasonably
delayed action, the Administrative Procedure Act prohibitions on
unreasonable delay can act as a constraint preventing the agency8
from acting in an untimely manner or indefinitely failing to act.
be satisfied with
is 90 days. If 90 days is the usual time period, the proof requirement can
holding.
so
found
this information. No cases have been
Hardin, 425
96. FTC v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 336 F.2d 687, 691 (5th Cir. 1964); Kent v.
to prove
sufficient
is
it
that
hold
Weingarten
and
Kent
Both
F.2d 1346 at 1350 (5th Cir. 1970).
or its employfacts establishing a "dilatory attitude" on the part of the administrative agency
that has been
ees as an alternative to proving the normal time period for the type of action
the Court of
delayed. However, in Chromcraft Corp. v. EEOC, 465 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1972),
"unreasonably
of
standard
706
section
APA
the
construed
Circuit
Fifth
Appeals for the
only untimely
delayed" administrative action to require proof that the delayed action was not
agency
delayed
include
to
part,
in
"unreasonable,"
defined
court
The
unreasonable.
but also
v.
EEOC
Accord,
748.
at
Id.
caprice."
or
action caused by "slothfulness, lethargy, inertia
a three-year
Security,
Exchange
In
1976).
Cir.
(5th
1214
F.2d
529
Bank,
Security
Exchange
was
and four-month delay by EEOC in investigating a claim of employment discrimination
inter alia,
held to be insufficient to block an EEOC subpoena of employer's records because,
attitude on
there was no statutory time limitation and employer did not prove a " 'dilatory
In EEOC v.
the part of the Commission or its staff.' " Id. at 1216-17 (citing Chromcraft).
eighteen-month
Moore Group, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 1002 (N.D. Ga. 1976), the court held that an
employment
unexplained delay by the EEOC in filing suit on behalf of an employee claiming
illustratconduct
constituted
justification
other
or
backlog
no
was
there
when
discrimination
ing a "dilatory attitude" on the part of the EEOC.
97. Nader v. FCC, 520 F.2d 182 (D.C. Cir. 1975). In Nader, customers of American
approving
Telephone and Telegraph Co., Inc. obtained judicial review of an FCC decision
two
rate increases for A.T.&T. In that proceeding, they attacked inaction by the FCC as to
the
affected
expenses
Electric
Western
how
of
question
the
issues. Those issues related to
Electric issues
determination of a fair rate of return for A.T.&T.Id. at 196-97. The Western
would ever
were first raised with the FCC in 1965. The court questioned whether the FCC
petitioners,
complete the Western Electric issues and stated that "we are concerned as are the
Id. at
with the Commission's failure to conduct these proceedings within a reasonable time."
it
205. After reviewing the procedural history of the FCC proceedings, the court noted that
to decide
agency
any
for
time
enough
be
should
years
'Nine
"
that,
customer's
the
with
agreed
go on
almost any issue. There comes a point when relegating issues to proceedings that
to address
without conclusion in any kind of reasonable time frame is tantamount to refusing
the issues at all-and the result is a denial of justice.' " Id. at 206 [emphasis added] (quoting
reply brief of Petitioner at 8-9).
Ga. 1976)
98. EEOC v. Metropolitan Atlanta Girls' Club, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 1006 (N.D.
party does
(two and one-half years delay by EEOC in filing complaint on behalf of charging
not violate EEOC statutory mandate which sets no limit on filing complaints but APA section
706 can be utilized to claim that such delay is unreasonable). Hill v. Federal Power Comm'n,
an
335 F.2d 355 (5th Cir. 1964). In Hill, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed
appliFPC denial of a rate increase because the Commission's denial was based upon the
cant's failure to satisfy standards first mentioned in the FPC denial decision. In so holding,
the court stated it was "too late for an agency to declare the standards to be met by it decision
of
holding that they have not been met." Id. at 356. According to the court, the requirement
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Since the Administrative Procedure Act prohibits only
unreasonabledelays, courts examine the reasons for delayed actions
to determine if those reasons justify the delay. Delayed action has
been held to be unreasonable when it is caused by lethargy, slothfulness, inertia or a dilatory attitude on the part of the agency. 9 However, when delay is caused by insufficient personnel to handle the
workload it is not necessarily unreasonable,'"' unless the time period
is so long that unfairness would result to the parties delayed.'"'
Finally, when delay is caused by the time necessary to determine
whether criminal charges related to the administrative proceeding
should be filed, that delay is reasonable. 0 '
The Administrative Procedure Act requires that delayed action
cause prejudice to the party objecting to the delay before judicial
relief will be granted." 3 Although the delay itself can be more costly
the APA that "persons entitled to notice of an agency hearing shall
be timely informed of
(3) the matter of fact and law asserted" has been violated when the
development and
communication of those standards did not occur prior to the hearing
in this case. Id. at 355.
(The court cited the quoted section as 5 U.S.C.A. § 10 04(a) where it appeared
in that codification at the time of the case. The same language is codified at 5 U.S.C.
§ 554(b)(1976)).
99. Chromcraft Corp. v. EEOC, 465 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1972); EEOC
v. Exchange
Security Bank, 529 F.2d 1214 (5th Cir. 1976). See textual discussion of
these two cases, supra
note 96.
100. Chromcraft Corp. v. EEOC, 465 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1972) (19 employees
in EEOC
regional office were greatly overburdened when there were 810 active
cases in their office with
100 new cases a month filed which required investigation). But see Caswell
v. Califano, 435
F. Supp. 127 (D. Me. 1977) (claim of inadequate resources does not justify
violation of time
limits mandated by Social Security Act). Accord, White v. Mathews,
559 F.2d 852 (2d Cir.
1977); Accord, as to inadequate staffing, Poirrier v. St. James Parish Police
Jury, 372 F. Supp.
1021 (E.D. La. 1974).
101. Nader v. FCC, 520 F.2d 182, 206 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Equal Employment
Opportunity
Comm'n v. Bell Helicopter Co., 426 F. Supp. 785 (N.D. Tex. 1976) (five
to seven-year delay
in filing suit after EEOC determined that discrimination claims were
justified cannot be held
to be reasonable because of overworked staff; the period of time involved
is "too long");
Accord, as to unreasonableness of seven-year EEOC delay in processing
discrimination charge
when only explanation is too many cases, EEOC v. American Nat'l
Bank, 420 F. Supp. 181
(E.D. Va. 1976).
102. Levy v. United States, 477 F.2d 916 (6th Cir. 1973).
103. Chromcraft Corp. v. EEOC, 465 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1972). In Chromcraft,
the court
held that section 706 requires a finding of prejudice as a prerequisite
to judicial relief. The
court based this conclusion on the following language of section 706: "
'In making the determinations, the court shall review the whole record or those parts of it cited
by a party, and due
account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicialerror.' "Id. at 747 (emphasis
added). Because
the employer in Chromcraft was unable to prove that it was prejudiced
by the Commission's
delayed action, the court of appeals reversed the district court order "setting
aside the Commission's demand for production of evidence for use in an investigation
of Title VII charges
filed against the Company." Id. at 746-47. Accord, Irish v. SEC, 367 F.2d
637 (9th Cir. 1966)
(no proof of prejudice from delay in revocation proceedings); EEOC
v. Exchange Security
Bank, 529 F.2d 1214 (5th Cir. 1976) (employer failed to prove it was
prejudiced because of
the delay); EEOC v. Metropolitan Atlanta Girls Club, Inc., 416 F. Supp.
1006 (N.D. Ga. 1976)
(employer not prejudiced by 272-day delay in filing complaint, because
it neither disposed
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4
to the party objecting,' courts have required proof of prejudice
"5
above and beyond the mere passage of tine.' Impairment of the
complaining party's ability to present its case because witnesses are
no longer available, or available witnesses' memories have failed, or
relevant records have been destroyed, are all sufficient to constitute
prejudice. 06 Prolonged denial of benefits to which the complaining
07
party is entitled is also sufficient. It should not, however, be difficult to establish prejudice the longer an agency delays or if irreparable harm will be caused by such delay even though the above
grounds have not been established.

C.

Specific Statutes

Act, specific statIn addition to the Administrative Procedure
0 5 the Hill-Burton Act, 109 and the Social Secuutes such as FIFRA,
rity Act"0 provide substantive standards for reviewing delayed action. For example, in White v. Mathews, " the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit upheld a district court order granting equitable
relief to plaintiff's class based on the Social Security Act's requirenegotiations with
of relevant records nor did it seek to withdraw from voluntary adjustment
EEOC within four months prior to filing of complaint).
at note 19 supra.
104. See Federal Power Comm'n v. Hunt, 376 U.S. 515 (1964) and text
1967). In Bryant,
Cir.
(2d
565
F.2d
389
105. Bryant Chucking Grinder Co. v. NLRB,
issuing a complaint
in
counsel
general
NLRB
the
by
delay
fifteen-month
a
that
held
the Court
delay in the issuance of
did not justify the relief requested by the employer because "mere
568.
at
Id.
relief."
of
denial
the
for
ground
insufficient
is
the complaint
1976) (five year delay
106. EEOC v. Moore Group, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 1002 (N.D. Ga.
destroyed relevant time
between employee's filing charge and EEOC's filing suit; employer
were unknown;
cards; witnesses were no longer employed by employer and their whereabouts
785,
prejudice established according to the court); EEOC v. Bell Helicopter Co., 426 F. Supp.
witnesses became
destroyed,
were
records
which
in
delay
(nine-year
1976)
793 (N.D. Tex.
prejudice was estabunavailable, and available witnesses' memories faded; the court held
(E.D. Va. 1976).
i87
181,
Supp.
F.
420
Bank,
Nat'l.
American
v.
EEOC
lished). Accord,
the court noted
Caswell,
In
1977).
Me.
(D.
127
107. Caswell v. Califano, 435 F. Supp.
region "nearly half of
England
New
the
in
45%
is
hearing
a
after
rate
reversal
the
that since
which they are legitimately
plaintiff class is subjected to prolonged deprivation of benefits to
both section 205(b) of
entitled" because of delay. 435 F. Supp. at 137. This delay violates
Procedure
Administrative
the
and
1975),
V
(Supp.
405(b)
§
U.S.C.
42
the Social Security Act,
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (1976). Id. at 134.
(D.C. Cir. 1970). See
108. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093
text accompanying notes 52-58 supra.
(E.D. La. 1974) aff'd
109. Poirrier v. St. James Parish Police Jury, 372 F. Supp. 1021
In Poirrier,the
supra.
60-64
notes
531 F.2d 316 (5th Cir. 1976). See text and accompanying
his discretion
abused
have
may
Secretary
the
that
claim
a
pleaded
had
court found plaintiffs
funds or
granted
the
recover
to
sued
either
have
under the Hill-Burton Act when he could
justification. Id.
adequate
without
neither
did
but
contract,
of
breach
for
grantees
sued the
at 1024-26.
v. Califano, 435 F. Supp.
110. White v. Mathews, 559 F.2d 852 (2nd Cir. 1977); Caswell
127 (D. Me. 1977).
111. Note 93 supra.
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ment that social security disability hearings be held within a reasonable time."'
The plaintiff class in White, certified by the district court, sued
to challenge hearing delays that averaged between 195.2 days nationally to 211.8 days in Connecticut for the entry of final decisions
by administrative law judges after the date the hearing was requested."' The court of appeals affirmed the district court's finding
that the Social Security Act was violated by these hearing delays.
In so affirming, the court construed section 205(b)" ' of the Act to
require a hearing within a reasonable time. Three factors were considered by the court: (1) the disability insurance benefits program's
purpose is "to alleviate the immediate and often severe hardship
that results from a wage earner's disability.""' That purpose is not
adequately served by excessive delays in scheduling hearings; (2)
because fifty per cent of those claimants whose hearings and decisions are delayed are granted benefits after hearing, so the program's purpose is even further ill served;" 6 and (3) because pretermination hearings are not required by Mathews v. Eldridge,I" the
hardship to the wage earner acknowledged in Mathews v. Eldridge
"makes it all the more important to expedite adjudication
of claims
of erroneous termination.""'
The court of appeals in White rejected as a justification for the
delays (making them reasonable according to the HEW Secretary)
both the heavy backlog caused by the addition of "Black Lung"" 9
and "Supplemental Security Income"' 2 0 cases and the efforts of the
Secretary to increase staff and resources to reduce that delay. 2' The
court also rejected the Secretary's argument that congressional refusal to set specific time limits for hearing dispositions means the
Secretary has sole discretion to schedule hearings.2 2 The court con112. 559 F.2d at 854.
113. White v. Mathews, 434 F.Supp. 1252, 1254 (D. Conn. 1976).
114. 42 U.S.C. § 405(b) (Supp. V 1975).
115. 559 F.2d at 858.
116. Id.
117. 424 U.S. 319, 342 (1976).
118. 559 F.2d at 859.
119. Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, 30 U.S.C.
§§ 901-960 (1970).
120. Title XVI, Supplemental Security Income for the Aged, Blind,
and Disabled, 42
U.S.C. §§ 1381-85 (Supp. V 1975).
121. 559 F.2d at 859. See Caswell v. Califano, 435 F. Supp. 127
(D. Me. 1977) for a
detailed discussion by the court of the problems discussed herein.
For one example, the court
in Caswell noted that the backlog of cases produced by the addition
of "Black Lung" and
"S.S.I." cases had reached "crisis proportions" with hearing requests
having increased nationwide from 36,780 in 1973 to 113,000 as of April, 1975. Id. at
130.
122. 559 F.2d at 859-60. The court specifically concluded that Congress'
decision "not
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cluded the challenged hearing delays violated the section 205(b)
3
standard of a reasonable opportunity for a hearing."
When a statute is purposefully drafted with delays built in to
achieve some legitimate purpose, review of claims of delayed agency
action is very limited. In InternationalAssocation of Machinists
24
and Aerospace Workers v. National Mediation Board, a labor
in
union battling National Airlines in a "major labor dispute" sued
"proffer
to
the district court to force the National Mediation Board
arbitration" on the grounds that a section of the Railway Labor
Act 2. required proferring of arbitration when the Board's dispute
mediation was not successful. The union felt mediation had not
on
been successful and wanted to be released from the Act's ban
failure
the
claimed
strikes while mediation is ongoing.' The union
to proffer arbitration was an unreasonably delayed agency action.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed
the district court's grant of the requested order'" stating that the
make exhauspurpose of the Railway Labor Act's procedures is "to
"128
process.
interminable
tion of the Act's remedies an almost
The court of appeals reasoned that although "the Mediation
Board began its handling of the matter with a delay that ill suits
' 2 9 there were sufficient objective facts to
its need for expedition,'
justify a conclusion that the Board's continuance of mediation was
31 0
valid and made in good faith. A party harmed by delayed Board
remaction under the Act, however, is not totally without judicial
edy. The court interpreted the Act to provide a limited judicial
scrutiny allowing judicial relief "if the Board continues mediation
on a basis that is completely and patently arbitrary and for a period
that is completely and patently unreasonable .... ,,131 Thus the
mediation process is not one that can132never be terminated when
delay.
there is a claim of unreasonable
of the delays." 559 F.2d
to impose time limits should not be interpreted as an endorsement
Caswell.
in
rejected
and
at 860. A similar argument was raised
not decide whether the
123. 559 F.2d at 860. In so holding the court stated "we need
Clause." Id. at 861,
Process
Due
the
or
Act
Procedure
delays also violated the Administrative
n.12.
124. 425 F.2d 527 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
125. 45 U.S.C. § 155 (1972).
126. 425 F.2d at 529.
127. Id. at 542-43.
Line Ry. v. United Transp.
128. Id. at 534, citing and quoting Detroit & Toledo Shore
Union, 396 U.S. 142 (1969).
129. 425 F.2d at 541.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 537.
Union, 450 F.2d 603 (D.C.
132. Id. at 537; Delaware & Hudson Ry. v. United Transp.
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D.

Due Process of Law
Another substantive standard is the due process clause. Claiming that unduly delayed agency action violates due process, litigants
have sought to establish constitutional violations in tardy agency
action. This section will examine the earliest federal cases finding
delayed agency actions to be violative of due process. It will then
discuss current federal cases raising the same issue and federal cases
examining whether due process is violated by statutory procedures
when those procedures are challenged on undue delay grounds. Finally, it will discuss state cases in which unduly delayed administrative action is claimed to violate due process.
1. Federal cases
Unreasonably delayed agency action was declared to violate the
due process clause' in 1926 in Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone,
Co.'34 In another case in 1941, an employer unsuccessfully claimed
that a nine month delay by the NLRB in issuing a complaint after
charges were filed violated due process.' 5 The court held due process
was not violated even though the delay in filing the complaint was
requested by the union without consulting the employer.'
More recently, the United States Supreme Court's articulation
of when procedural due process requires a hearing before deprivation of a property interest can occur provides the foundation for an
analysis of unduly delayed agency action as a due process violation. 37 In Mathews v. Eldridge,3 the United States Supreme Court
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 911 (1971). In this case, the Court of Appeals
for the District
of Columbia Circuit reversed the granting of an injunction by the district
court blocking a
strike by U.T.U. against selected carriers after the Railway Labor Act
dispute resolution
processes had been compiled with. Id. at 604-05. In reversing, the court
noted that judicial
review under the Railway Labor Act of a claim of unreasonable delay is
very limited, citing
the principal case. However, it concluded that while the procedures of the
Act are " 'almost
interminable,' the process is not completely 'interminable.' It does at some
time come to an
end. Such a time has been reached in the situation before us." Id. at 608.
133. Under the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution.
134. 270 U.S. 587 (1926). See text accompanying note 17 supra.
135. Berkshire Employees Ass'n of Berkshire Knitting Mills v. NLRB, 121
F.2d 235 (3rd
Cir. 1941).
136. 121 F.2d at 237. See also Irish v. SEC, 367 F.2d 637 (9th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied,
386 U.S. 911 (1967) (delay in revocation proceeding unsuccessfully claimed
to violate due
process).
137. In a number of cases in the last nine years, the United States Supreme
Court has
determined when a pre-deprivation hearing is required by procedural due
process. Some of
these cases are: (1) Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (procedural due
process requires
notice and an opportunity to be heard before welfare benefits can be
terminated); (2)
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (procedural due
process requires
notice and opportunity to be heard before wages can be garnished; (3)
Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U.S. 67 (1972) (procedural due process requires notice and an opportunity
to be heard
before property can be seized under a replevin statute); (4) Mitchell v. W.
T. Grant Co., 416
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held that fifth amendment due process did not require an opportunity for a hearing prior to termination of social security benefits.
The Supreme Court's due process analysis in Mathews is a good
starting point for discussion. The Court noted that "[tihe fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard
'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.' "139 The Court
articulated three factors to be analyzed in determining what process
is due. These factors are the private interest at stake, the government interest involved, and, most importantly for this analysis,
"the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedure used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards ..... "I This last factor, the risk
of erroneous deprivation, is also present when benefit entitlement
hearings are unduly delayed by administrative agencies.
The Mathews Court acknowledged that "the degree of potential
deprivation that may be created by a particular decision is a factor
to be considered in assessing the validity of any administrative decisionmaking process."'" Similarly, the Court stated that "as we recognized last term in Fusari v. Steinberg . . . 'the possible length of
factor in
wrongful deprivation of. . .benefits . . . is an important
1,12
interests.'
private
the
on
action
official
assessing the impact of
Applying that analysis to the social security disability benefit determination process, the Court found that "[iun view of the torpidity
of this administrative review process . . . and the typically modest
resources of the family unit of the physically disabled worker, the
hardship imposed upon the erroneously terminated disability recippersonal property before
U.S. 600 (1974) (Louisiana sequestration statute allowing seizure of
post seizure hearing
immediate
because
process
due
hearing does not violate procedural
419 U.S. 601 (1975)
opportunity provided); (5) North Ga. Finishing Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.,
seizure of bank
before
heard
be
to
opportunity
and
notice
requires
(procedural due process
565 (1975) (procedural due
account under garnishment statute); (6) Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S.
a hearing either before or
process violated by statute allowing school suspensions without
v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319
Mathews
(7)
and
immediately after the student is suspended);
to be heard prior to
opportunity
and
notice
require
not
does
process
due
(1976) (procedural
of hearings and
timing
of
discussion
a
For
benefits).
termination of Social Security disability
and subsequent
repossession
self-help
private
in
involved
interests
debtor
and
the creditor
and Self Help Repossession,
hearings, see Alexander, Cutting the GordianKnot: State Action
(1975).
913-31
893,
L.Q.
CONST.
HASTINGS
2
138. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
139. Id. at 333, quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 549, 552 (1965).
likelihood of erroneous
140. Id. at 335. For a discussion of techniques to reduce the
Side of Due ProcManagement
The
determinations by social welfare agencies, see Mashaw,
Fairness, and
Accuracy,
of
Assurance
the
on
Notes
Litigation
and
cess: Some Theoretical
772 (1974).
Rzv.
.L.
CORNELL
59
Claims,
Timeliness in the Adjudication of Social Welfare
141. 424 U.S. at 341.
142. Id.
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ient may be significant.' ' 1 This is particularly true because the
time period between the termination of benefits and the posthearing decision averages one year.'44
In Aiello v. Wilmington, ," a plaintiff fireman claimed that a 98day delay between the date of his suspension by the Wilmington fire
department and the date of the administrative hearing on his suspension violated due process because he was deprived of his salary
for the 98 days and because he was ordered, he claimed, by the fire
department not to take another job during that time period."'4 Most
of the delay occurred because the department waited for the disposition of criminal charges arising out of the same incident. When
these charges were dismissed,' another month's delay was arguably
caused by a request of plaintiff's lawyer for a continuance.'" g Plaintiff was found by the hearing board to have violated good behavior
regulations of the department, and was penalized by having his
salary withheld for the 98-day time period.'49
The Aiello court, deciding whether to grant or deny crossmotions for summary judgment, framed the issue to be "whether
due process delayed is due process denied." , 0 The court went on to
ask two questions:
(1) can a mere delay in providing a hearing rise to the level of a
constitutional deprivation if the hearing, when finally provided, otherwise procedurally satisfied the requirements of due process; and (2)
if so, on the facts of this case, did the delay of 98 days from the time
of Aiello's suspension until the hearing impermissibly deny Aiello his
right to due process?'5 '
The court discussed the applicability of Mathews v. Eldridge,'2
Goss v. Lopez,' 3 and Fusariv. Steinberg'54 to the question of when
143.

Id.at 342.

144.

Id.

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

426 F. Supp. 1272 (D. Del. 1976).
Id. at 1290.
Id. at 1275-76.
Id. at 1279. This reason was suggested by defendant city.
Id.at 1280.
Id. at 1290.
Id.
Note 138 supra.
153. 419 U.S. 565 (1975). The Aiello Court noted the timeliness requirement articulated
in Goss v. Lopez, which was the "student was entitled to the necessary
notice and rudimentary hearing 'as soon as practicable' following the actual suspension."
[emphasis added]
[citation omitted]. 426 F. Supp. at 1290.
154. 419 U.S. 379 (1975). The Aiello Court quoted, as indicative of the
Supreme Court's
view of the relationship of delay to procedural due process, the following
language from
Fusari: "Prompt and adequate administrative review provides an opportunity
for considera-
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5
"temporal delay" is a denial of due process.' The court stated that
although those cases decided "the constitutionality per se of suspension or termination procedures, their language and reasoning support the conclusion that timing nonetheless is an important element

of due process. ''156

The Aiello court went on to articulate a set of factors to be
analyzed when determining if a delayed hearing constitutes a constitutional deprivation. These factors include:
(1) the actual duration of delay between the suspension and hearing;
(2) the degree of potential deprivation resulting from the suspension;
(3) the adequacy of administrative review procedures utilized prior
to the suspension; (4) the adequacy of the post suspension hearing
with concomitant time constraints and restraints; and (5) the extent
to or otherwise knowto which the individual suspended contributed
157
delay.
the
in
acquiesced
willingly
and
ingly
Because there were numerous unresolved factual questions, the
Aiello court denied a motion for summary judgment and held that
this issue had to be resolved by the trier of fact. However, the court
did indicate that "some of these issues are sufficient to demonstrate
that serious deprivations of Aiello's due process rights may have
been implicated in the chronology of his suspension and trial board
hearing." '
The likelihood of serious deprivation because of delay does not
always entitle a party to judicial relief on due process grounds at
least when the assessment and collection of taxes is involved. In Bob
Jones University v. Simon,' 5 petitioner sought injunctive relief to
prevent the Internal Revenue Service from "revoking or threatening
to revoke petitioner's tax-exempt status . . . Petitioner alleged
Thus, the rapidity of
tion and correction of errors made in initial eligibility determinations.
the entire process.
of
sufficiency
the
assessing
administrative review is a significant factor in
1290).
at
Supp.
F.
426
in
(quoted
Id. at 389
155. 426 F. Supp. at 1290.
156. Id. at 1291. The court further discussed timing and due process. It stated:
courts have
Nor should such a conclusion be surprising since the basic right which the
practicable" after a
been seeking to protect is the right to a hearing "as soon as it is
the failure to
suspension has occurred, when legitimate considerations have excused
component of
provide a hearing prior to the actual suspension. However, this timing
necessity be
of
must
hearing,
a
precedes
suspension
a
where
procedural due process,
flexible.

Id. at 1291.
157. Id.
158. Id. The court indicated its perception of the harm caused Aiello by delayed action,
high; he was for all
when it stated: "In Aiello's case the degree of deprivation was extremely
precluded
intent and purposes deprived of what was his present source of income and possibly
41.
n.
1291,
at
Supp.
F.
426
employment."
of
from pursuing alternate sources
159. 416 U.S. 725 (1974).
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irreparable injury in the form of substantial federal income tax liability and the loss of contributions."160 It claimed the revocation
violated, inter alia, its due process rights. ' The United States Supreme Court acknowledged that petitioner would be harmed by
such a revocation1 62 and that petitioner could lose charitable contributions because of the time required for "postrevocation" judicial
review." 3
Nevertheless the Supreme Court disallowed petitioner's argument that precluding pre-enforcement judicial review of the revocation violates due process because petitioner will be irreparably injured while pursuing alternate review mechanisms.,"4 The Court's
rejection of pre-enforcement review was based on section 7421(a) of
the Anti-Injunction Act1 5 as interpreted,"6' which prohibits federal
courts from enjoining the assessment or collection of taxes absent a
showing that the proposed action "is plainly without a legal
basis."" 7' The Court reasoned that the absence of pre-enforcement
review does not deny petitioners due process because of the availability of post-enforcement review' and because of "the powerful
governmental interests in protecting the administration of the tax
system from premature judicial interference .
"..."I69
160. Id. at 735-36. Petitioner sought judicial relief to "enjoin the service
from revoking
a ruling letter declaring that petitioner qualifies for tax-exempt status
and from withdrawing
advance assurance to donors that contributions to petitioner will constitute
charitable deductions under Code § 170(c)(2), 26 U.S.C. § 170(c)(2).
Id. at 727.
161. 416 U.S. at 736.
162. The Court stated:
Because of the importance of inclusion in the Cumulative List, revocation
of a §
501(c)(3) ruling letter and consequent removal from the Cumulative
List is likely to
result in serious damage to a charitable organization. Revocation
not only threatens
the flow of contributions, it also subjects the affected organization
to FICA and FUTA
taxes and, assuming that the organization has taxable income and
does not qualify as
tax exempt under another subsection of § 501, to federal income tax.
Id. at 730.
163. 416 U.S. at 731. The Court stated: "[blut these postrevocation
avenues of review
take substantial time, during which the organization is certain
to lose contributions from
those donors whose gifts are contingent on entitlement to charitable
deductions under §
170(c)(2)." Id.
164. Id. at 746.
165. 26 U.S.C. § 7 421(a) (1970).
166. 416 U.S. at 745, citing Enochs v. William Packing & Navigation
Co., Inc., 370 U.S.
1, 6-7 (1962).
167. 416 U.S. at 745.
168. Id. at 746. The Court noted that "[tihese review procedures offer
petitioner a full,
albeit delayed, opportunity to litigate the legality of the Service's
revocation of tax exempt
status and withdrawal of advance assurance of deductibility." Id.
169. 416 U.S. at 747. The court emphasized the dilemma posed for
petitioner by delayed
review. It stated:
We do not say that these avenues of review are the best that can
be devised. They
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Since the Supreme Court in Bob Jones University analyzed the
due process consequences when judicial review is delayed to the
detriment of the party objecting to the delayed review, the Court's
holding is not directly applicable to the due process analysis of
delayed agency action. However, the Court's holding is applicable
by analogy and, in any case, the holding is very important because
it is the most recent United States Supreme Court case directly
discussing whether due process protects litigants from harm caused
by delayed governmental action.
The failure of a local administrative agency both to promptly
decide whether to grant or deny a requested park permit and to
promptly inform the applicant of its decision was held to violate due
process in Slate v. McFetridge.70 In Slate, the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit decided that a sixteen-day delay by a local park
district agency in responding to an applicant's request for a permit
to use a park for a political rally in Chicago during the 1968 Democratic Party nominating convention violated the due process
clause.' 7 ' "[T]heir prompt resolution of Slate's permit request was
a dictate of due process in the protection of First Amendment
rights."' 72 The conclusion of the court of appeals was based on the
present serious problems of delay, during which the flow of donations to an organization will be impaired and in some cases perhaps even terminated .... And although
the congressional restriction to post-enforcement review may place an organization
claiming tax-exempt status in a precarious financial position, the problems presented
do not rise to the level of constitutional infirmities ...
Id. The court went on to acknowledge the difficult position petitioner is placed in, absent preenforcement judicial review. It stated: "In holding that § 7421(a) blocks the present suit, we
are not unaware that Congress has imposed an especially harsh regime on § 501(c)(3) organizations threatened with loss of tax-exempt status and with withdrawal of advance assurance
of deductibility of contributions." 416 U.S. at 749.
170. 484 F.2d 1169 (7th Cir. 1973).
171. Id. at 1177.
172. Id. at 1176. In so holding, the Court was very critical of the local agency's inaction.
It stated:
Over two weeks later-sixteen days to be exact-Barry called Slate to arrange a meeting. We can only guess at what caused this delay. Whatever the reasons were, however,
they cannot justify the tardy response on any view of the facts. Barry testified that
the estimate of "100,000 people" caused him immediately to view the communication
as a request for Soldier Field, the only facility in his opinion, capable of filling this
need. Assuming this to be true and justifiable, it was a foregone conclusion on July 13
or shortly thereafter that plaintiffs would not be getting a permit. Barry's failure
immediately to notify plaintiffs of this fact as the hours remaining before Convention
time ticked away was a bald abuse of authority and an outright violation of the
mandate in Freedman of prompt administrative action. If, moreover, Barry did not in
fact view the July 13 letter to be a single-facility request-an inference easily drawn
in light of plaintiffs' expressed willingness in the July 13 letter to compromise on a rally
site-Barry's delay is equally if not more reprehensible. A licensing authority is
granted a reasonable period to rule on a permit application largely because time is
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United States Supreme Court's requirement of a prompt administrative determination in the film censorship prior restraint cases of
Freedman v. Maryland,"I Teitel Film Corp. v. Cusack,' 74 and

Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas."5
The application of due process principles to claims that agency
action has been unconstitutionally delayed is much more complicated when other interests are present. For example, due process of
law does not compel the speeding up of agency action when to do
so would violate other constitutionally protected interests such as
the right to counsel' 6 or the right of an agency to proceed effectively
to resolve issues of general applicability by rulemaking.'" Analogously, due process does not prohibit the judicial disallowance of
proof of claims in a bankruptcy proceeding when proof of those
claims would unreasonably delay those proceedings. "'
needed for negotiations and the making of arrangements for and with the applicant.
Surely this purpose is not served by allowing the official well over two weeks to sit on
his hands. [emphasis added.]
Id. at 1177.
173. 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
174. 390 U.S. 139 (1968).
175. 390 U.S. 676 (1968); all three cases are cited at 484 F.2d at 1174-75.
176. See Great Lakes Screw Corp. v. NLRB, 409 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1969). In this case,
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit set aside an NLRB order excluding from the
hearing the attorney for Great Lakes Screw Corporation for conduct alleged by the NLRB to
be contemptuous, but not found to be so by the court. The court held that the exclusion of
the attorney violated both the APA, section 555(b), and administrative due process. Id. at
377-382. In so holding and remanding the case to the NLRB for a new hearing, the court of
appeals stated:
Itihe delay, expense and inconvenience inherent in setting aside the order of the
Board and remanding the case to it for a new hearing is regrettable; however, "the
avoidance of delay cannot justify a tolerance of violations of rights fundamental in the
administration of justice." Inland Steel v. National Labor Relations Board, 7 Cir., 109
F.2d 9, 21 (1940) citing Montgomery Ward & Co. v. National Labor Relations Board,
8 Cir., 103 F.2d 147, 156 (1939).
Id. at 381.
177. Buckeye Cablevision, Inc. v. United States, 438 F.2d 948 (6th Cir. 1971). In
Buckeye Cablevision, Inc., the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld a decision of
the FCC to stop "all major market CATV hearings in progress..." until the FCC completed
rulemaking proceedings in which it would develop "new industry-wide CATV rules." Id. at
950. Buckeye Cablevision, Inc. claimed that the FCC's delay in acting on its request to
expand Cable Service in Toledo, Ohio, which request was stopped because of the rulemaking
proceedings, violated due process of law. The court of appeals rejected that claim. The court
stated that although the two and one-half year time period "since the petition was originally
filed is, of course, an unfortunate delay ..
" Id. at 948, the freeze order which produced
the delay did not violate due process because the order "was necessary and reasonable in light
of the initiation of the rulemaking proceedings to provide an effective procedure consistent
with due process for the making of the new rules.
... Id. at 954.
178. In re Cartridge Television, Inc., 535 F.2d 1388 (2d Cir. 1976). In this case, a
bankruptcy judge did not allow stockholders of a bankrupt corporation to prove contingent
and unliquidated stock fraud claims against that corporation because proof of those claims
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When a specific statutory time period is provided for administrative action, a due process deprivation can be found when the
agency fails to act within the statutory time period.'79 However,
when agency procedures are mandated by statute, but no time limits are set for the completion of those procedures, it is much more
difficult to find a due process violation. 80 Similarly, when compliance with statutory procedures by an applicant for welfare benefits
causes delayed receipt of benefits by that applicant because of
court congestion, due process is not violated.' 8 '
would have unduly delayed completion of bankruptcy proceedings. The bankruptcy judge's
action was premised on section 57(d) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 93(d) (1970). On
appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected the stockholders' claim that Fifth
Amendment due process is violated if they are not allowed to prove their claims in bankruptcy
535 F.2d
because then "the defrauded shareholders would be left completely unpaid.
at 1391.
179. Johnson v. Greer, 477 F. 2d 101 (5th Cir. 1973). In Johnson, the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit affirmed a trial court judgment finding that detention of plaintiff by
defendant psychiatric facility administrator under a Texas "emergency protective custody"
statute was unlawful because plaintiff was detained for five days under a 24-hour warrant.
The court upheld the trial jury's conclusion that the administrative delay in obtaining a
second warrant authorizing detention of plaintiff for a further time period "became unreasonable at a time 24 hours after his initial authorization to retain Johnson had expired (i.e., after
Johnson had been detained for a total of 48 hours)." Id. at 104. The court noted that under
Texas law defendant was required to either release plaintiff or seek a warrant for an additional
time period. The defendant is, however, allowed a "reasonable period of time to obtain the
" Id. The court of appeals concluded that the unlawful detention
necessary court order ..
of plaintiff constituted a deprivation of plaintiff's liberty interest under due process of law
sufficient for a SectioA 1983 civil rights action. Id.
180. See Independent Voters of Illinois v. Kusper, 490 F.2d 1126 (7th Cir. 1974). In
Kusper, plaintiffs challenged, inter aliaon due process grounds, the refusal of defendant local
agency to provide access to candidate petitions and voter records so that plaintiffs could
determine if sufficient signatures of validly registered voters had been placed on a local
election nominating petition. Id. at 1127-28. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
held that the local agency's delay of two days in supplying copies of petitions requested by
plaintiffs was not "unreasonable administrative delay" sufficient to violate Fourteenth
Amendment due process even though a court order issued shortly thereafter required disclosure of the petitions to plaintiff. Id. at 1131, n.8. See United States v. One (1) 1972 Wood, 19
foot Custom Boat, FL 8443AY, 501 F.2d 1327 (5th Cir. 1974). In this case,' the owner of a
rented boat (seized pursuant to 19 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1604 (1970) because the boat was used by
a renter to "transport marijuana") challenged on due process grounds a ten-month delay
between seizure of the boat and institution by the United States Attorney of forfeiture proceedings. The owner's claim was denied because, as required by statute, "The customs investigation and administrative processing was not completed..." until eight months after the
seizure. 501 F.2d at 1329. The additional two month delay was caused both by the owner's
bargaining with the government over the amount of the charges for storage and by the time
required for the United States Attorney to bring the forfeiture proceedings. Because the
statutory procedures were followed by the customs officers and the United States Attorney,
no due process violation was established by the delay. Id.
181. Rasmussen v. Toia, 420 F. Supp. 757 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (statutory procedures requiring court adjudication as a precondition to receipt of welfare benefits do not violate due
process because rationally related to legitimate legislative objective even though court congestion results in five-months to one-year delay in obtaining required order of adjudication).
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State cases

State courts have also found due process violations when litigants are harmed by delayed administrative agency action. In In Re
Arndt' a driver whose license was suspended for six months for a
refusal to take a breathalyzer test when he was arrested for driving
while intoxicated challenged the suspension-on due process grounds
because the administrative agency involved delayed its suspension
decision for two years and eight months after the driver was arrested." 3 The New Jersey Supreme Court vacated the suspension
because the proceedings were unduly delayed without any explanation; in violation of a statutory requirement that required suspension proceedings to be completed within a reasonable time, and in
violation of fundamental fairness required by procedural due process."'84 Other New Jersey cases have required proof of prejudice to
the party claiming delay for delayed agency action to constitute a
due process violation. 5 ' These cases also require the party claiming
delay to demand prompt action 8 and not to acquiesce in the delayed action.8 7
Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Rinck 81 the Pennsylvania
Commonwealth Court reversed a six month suspension of a real
estate broker's license and ordered reinstatement of the license by
the state real estate agency. The suspension occurred when the real
estate commission reopened a misrepresentation complaint against
the broker two and one-half years after the original complaint was
dismissed following a hearing on the charges. The broker's license
182. 67 N.J. 432, 341 A.2d 596 (1975).
183. 67 N.J. at 434-35, 341 A.2d at 597. The court noted that approximately 21 months
passed between the arrest and the suspension hearing and another eleven months passed
between the hearing and the issuance of the suspension decision. Id.
184. 67 N.J. at 434-37, 341 A.2d at 597-98, citing inter alia, Smith v. Illinois Bell Tel.
Co., 270 U.S. 587 (1926).
185. Arrarat Inc. v. State Dep't of Environmental Protection, 132 N.J. Super. 305, 333
A.2d 548 (1975) (no due process violation from four-year and five-month delay by local agency
in notifying plaintiff of approval of right of third party to exercise eminent domain rights on
plaintiff's land because no prejudice to plaintiff established as a result of delayed notice); In
Re Garber, 141 N.J. Super. 87, 357 A.2d 297 (1976) (no due process violation established by
12-month delay in issuing license suspension decision after hearing because driver, who retained his license pending the decision, did not prove that prejudice resulted from the delay).
186. Arrarat Inc. v. State Dep't of Environmental Protection, 132 N.J. Super. 305, 333
A.2d 548 (1975); In Re Garber, 141 N.J. Super. 87, 357 A.2d 297 (1976).
187. Appeal of Darcy, 114 N.J. Super. 454, 277 A.2d 226 (1971) (two-year delay in
holding Civil Service Commission hearing in which discharged employee challenged employment termination was reasonable because no prejudice proved as a result of delay and because
delayed action was due to a desire on the employee's part to wait until criminal charges
against him were resolved).
188. 355 A.2d 858 (1976).
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was suspended after a second hearing on the same charges.'" In
reversing, the court noted that it is unfair and a due process violation to reopen a closed administrative action at a later point in time.
The court reasoned that this is because "our citizens are entitled to
know that at some definite time administrative proceedings involving their rights and responsibilities have been concluded."' 90 Additionally, the longer action is delayed the more witnesses' memories
fade. Therefore, the court concluded that the commission could not
reopen the case originally decided in the broker's favor.' 9 '
Pennsylvania courts require proof of prejudice to the party
claiming delay before the courts will find that delayed agency action
constitutes a due process violation.'92 Either impairment of the
party's ability to present its case' 3 or of the party's livelihood'94 can
constitute such prejudice.
The New York Court of Appeals recognized that delayed administrative agency action can constitute a due process violation in
O'Keefe v. Murphy.' 5 In O'Keefe, two police officers, charged with
criminal conduct were dismissed from the New York City Police
Department after they refused to waive immunity and testify before
a grand jury.' 8 Both officers were reinstated in 1969 following a
189. Id. at 858-90.
190. Id. at 890.
191. Id.
192. State Dental Council & Examining Bd. v. Pollock, 457 Pa. 264, 318 A.2d 910
(1974). In Pollock, appellant dentist challenged a 30-day suspension of his license because,
among other grounds, due process was violated when the suspension hearing was held three
years after the occurrence of the events which triggered the suspension action. The court
noted that most of the delay was caused because the complaining witness, another dentist,
waited until he dissolved a business partnership with appellant before complaining to the
state board. The court rejected appellant's claim holding that a due process violation was
not established because appellant failed to prove that he was prejudiced by the delay. The
court indicated one type of prejudice to be "e.g., dead or missing witnesses or stale recollec" 318 A.2d at 916. The court went on to note: "While we do not
tions by witnesses ..
condone a delay of this magnitude, we cannot say that appellant was denied due process
because he has alleged no harm that resulted therefrom." Id.
193. State Dental Council & Examining Bd. v. Pollack, 457 Pa. at 274, 318 A.2d 916.
See note 192, supra.
194. State Bd. of Funeral Directors v. Cieslak, 355 A.2d 590 (1976). In this case, appellant funeral director contested a six-month suspension of his professional license claiming
that due process was violated by a two and one-half year delay by the board in issuing its
suspension decision after the hearing was held. Id. at 591-92. The court rejected his claim,
holding that he must prove that the delay prejudiced him before the court would find a due
process deprivation. The court noted that he was not able to prove such prejudice because
the suspension was stayed pending appeal allowing him to continue to practice his profession.
Id. at 593.
195. 38 N.Y.2d 563, 345 N.E.2d 292, 381 N.Y.S.2d 821 (1976).
196. One officer was dismissed in July, 1965; the other in November, 1966. 345 N.E.2d
at 293; 38 N.Y.2d at 567; 381 N.Y.S.2d at 823.
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United States Supreme Court decision'97 holding that public employees could not be fired for not waiving immunity. Both officers
were disciplined after subsequent hearings in 1970.198
The officers claimed that the delay in adjudicating their case
violated due process. The New York Court of Appeals noted that:
[NJevertheless, the due process aspect of delay in the administrative
context presents an important issue. The controlling standard is one
of "fairness and justice" . . . . Thus, whenever a delay in an admin-

istrative adjudication significantly or deliberately interferes with a
party's capacity to prepare or to present his case, the right to due
process has been violated. 9'
However, the court rejected the officers' claim concluding that the
delay in their case was not unreasonable and stating four reasons
for its conclusion. These were: (1) "The major part of the delay was
attributable to the operation of pre-Gardner law and the postGardnerdelay was not so extensive as to obstruct appellants' defenses";2 00 (2) the police officers had not proved that the delay impaired
their ability to present their case; (3) the Police Commissioner did
not wilfully delay their proceedings; and (4) the officers waited to
protest the delayed action until July, 1970. Therefore, because the
delay was not unreasonable, and because the court would not set
specific time limits for agency action, "the delays did not deprive
the appellants of fairness and justice mandated by due process." '0
197. Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968).
198. 345 N.E.2d at 293; 38 N.Y.2d at 567; 381 N.Y.S.2d at 821.
199. 345 N.E.2d at 294; 38 N.Y.2d at 568; 381 N.Y.S.2d at 823.
200. Id.
201. Id. Accord, as to proof of prejudice being required to establish a due process
violation when agency action is unreasonably delayed, Minnick v. Melton, 53 App. Div. 2d
1016, 386 N.Y.S.2d 488 (1976). In Minnick, petitioner driver claimed that a seventeen-month
delay between his arrest for driving while intoxicated and the scheduling of a Department of
Motor Vehicles hearing to determine if his driver's license should be revoked for refusing to
take a breathalyzer test violated his speedy trial rights. The driver sought to enjoin the
Department of Motor Vehicles Commissioner from holding the hearing. The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's determination that speedy trial rights
were violated because the revocation proceeding is non-criminal. The court went on to note
that the delayed action violated neither the statute, which sets no time limits for the holding
of hearings, nor due process because the driver has neither had his license suspended nor
established that his defense was impaired because a witness was unavailable. 53 App. Div.
2d at 1017, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 489. See also In re Scornavacca v. Leary, 38 N.Y.2d 583, 345 N.E.
2d 304, 381 N.Y.S.2d 833 (1976). In this case, the New York Court of Appeals reversed a trial
court order granting a hearing to determine if delays in adjudicating charges against police
officers for violating department rules entitled the officers to back pay when the officers' pay
was suspended while the charges were pending. The court held that since the officers could
not receive back pay (because they were convicted of the department charges) it would reverse
the order directing a hearing and order the dismissal of the complaint. 381 N.Y.S.2d at 83435, 38 N.Y.2d at 585, 345 N.E.2d at 305.
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State courts in Massachusetts, 22 California,20 3 and Wisconsin20 4 have
also discussed the applicability of procedural due process to claims
of unreasonably delayed agency action.
2.

Justiciability

The complexity of the due process analysis herein is illustrated
by analogy in Ad Hoc Committee on Judicial Administration v.
05
Commonwealth of Massachusetts. This case was a section 198320
civil rights class action brought to remedy an alleged failure by the
State of Massachusetts "to provide 'court facilities, judges, clerical
personnel and other facilities,' ",207 which failure plaintiffs claimed
violated their rights to speedy disposition of civil cases under fourteenth amendment due process and to speedy disposition of criminal cases under the sixth amendment. The plaintiffs sought federal
court relief to compel Massachusetts to alleviate court congestion
and related delayed disposition of criminal and civil cases by adding
208
more judicial personnel and facilities.
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the trial
court's dismissal of plaintiffs' section 1983 claim on grounds that the
claim was not justiciable. In so affirming, the court of appeals noted
that it would be difficult and maybe even impossible for a federal
court to formulate "timetables of general application" for all cases
so as to have a yardstick to measure "the maximum permissible
delay. ' 2 9 The difficulty is because of the numerous variables involved, because different cases may require different time periods,
and because different geographical areas may also require different
202. Boston Gas Co. v. Dep't of Pub. Utilities, 329 N.E.2d 712 (Mass. 1975) (procedural
due process violated when a ratemaking agency unduly delayed administrative action on
proposed interim rate increases while suspending the effect of those interim rates for the
maximum statutory time period, without holding a hearing or at least explaining the suspension to the Company under circumstances that the interim rate increases were clearly justified).
203. Peradotto v. State Personnel Bd., 25 Cal. App. 3d 30, 101 Cal. Rptr. 595 (1972)
(three-day delay in commencement of employment termination hearing did not violate due
process rights of terminated employee; because, although material witness was unavailable
on first of three days in which delay occurred, discharged employee knew in advance that
witness would be unavailable and failed to depose witness before he left).
204. Will v. Dep't of Health & Social Services of Wisconsin, 171 N.W.2d 378 (Wis. 1970)
(due process of law does not compel holding of AFDC hearings within 60 days of request;
because no proof of how long the delays were in holding hearings, and because no proof of
prejudice to plaintiffs from delayed hearings, court cannot find an unreasonable delay.
205. 488 F.2d 1241 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 986 (1974).
206. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1974).
207. 488 F.2d at 1243.
208. Id. at 1242-43.
209. Id. at 1244. See Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial
Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUDIES 399, 445-46 (1973).
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2 10 The
time periods.
court also noted that it is difficult to prove when
delay is caused by court congestion and not by, for example,
"discovery, negotiation, investigation, strategy, and, of course counsel's engagements on other matters, or even procrastination." ' ' Finally, the court of appeals observed that there may not be a judicial
remedy for a variety of reasons: (1) adding more judges and resources will not necessarily reduce delays in bringing cases to trial;
(2) a court would have to also consider all of the relevant scheduling,
management, and procedural devices to fashion an appropriate
remedy; and (3) it is undesirable for a federal court to intrude into
state judicial administration."'
Those state and federal courts that have analyzed whether delayed agency action violates due process have done so from the
perspective of a single case. The problems raised in Ad Hoc Committee on Judicial Administration are directly applicable when a
court is asked to fashion relief to stop system-wide delayed administrative agency action."' For example, judicially imposed timetables
create similar problems whether the imposition is on an administrative agency or on a court.
In conclusion, courts have used substantive standards to both
define and proscribe unreasonably delayed agency actions. These
standards include the Administrative Procedure Act, specific statutory mandates and due process of law.

IV.

REMEDIES

Once a court has determined that it has jurisdiction to decide
a claim of unreasonably delayed agency action, and once a court has
found a substantive standard to define and proscribe it, the court
must determine what remedy it will fashion to alleviate the harm
caused by the delay. Courts have chosen a variety of remedies,
including imposing timetables on agency action with sanctions for
non-compliance, remanding to the agency with instructions to decide the claim promptly, vacating the decision of the agency because of delay in reaching the decision, and dismissing the agency's
action on the merits because of agency delay in prosecuting that
action. This section will examine the judicial remedies created to
solve the problems caused by unduly delayed agency action.
Courts will impose strict timetables on administrative agencies
210. 488 F.2d at 1244.
211. Id. at 1245.
212. Id. at 1245-46.
213. See discussion of judicial remedies for systemwide delay in the Social Security
Administration in notes and text accompanying notes 214-223 infra.
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to remedy system-wide delays in adjudicating claims for entitlement to social welfare benefits. In an unprecedented and farreaching decision the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
White v. Mathews"' affirmed an order of the district court imposing
timetables on the Social Security Administration requiring the completion of disability hearings within a specific number of days. The
court of appeals also affirmed the district court's order requiring as
a sanction for non-compliance, the payment of benefits to applicants whose disability hearings were not completed within the mandated time periods." 5
White was a class action brought by applicants for social security disability benefits who requested hearings to contest the denial
or termination of their benefits. The plaintiff class claimed that the
Social Security Administration had unreasonably delayed both the
scheduling of their hearings and the issuing of decisions after hearings. The district court in Connecticut found "that the average time
between request for a hearing before an administrative law judge
and entry of his final decision for the period of January, 1973
through March, 1975 was 211.8 days for residents of Connecticut
and 195.2 days nationally." '
The district court in White found that these time periods violated the Social Security Act as well as the Administrative Procedure Act and due process of law. That court ordered a timetable
within which hearing decisions must be completed after a hearing
is requested and was set up as follows: (1) 180 days, effective July
1, 1977; (2) 150 days, effective December 31, 1977; and (3) 120 days,
effective July 1, 1978. The district court also ordered the Social
Security Administration to pay benefits to those people whose decisions are delayed beyond the deadline of the timetable "from the
expiration of the allotted time period until a decision is rendered.""'
In affirming the imposition of such a timetable, the court of
appeals concluded that the delays in scheduling hearings and issuing hearing decisions violated the Social Security Act.' Also, in
214. 559 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1977).
215. Id. at 854. The drastic and unprecedented nature of this decision is illustrated by
congressional action in raising Social Security taxes to ensure that the Social Security Insurance Fund does not go bankrupt.
216. 434 F. Supp. 1252 (D. Conn. 1976); quoting from the court of appeals opinion, 559
F.2d at 855.
217. 434 F. Supp. at 1252 aff'd, 559 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1977), quoting from the court of
appeals decision, 559 F.2d at 855. Payment of benefits would stop for those applicants receiving unfavorable decisions as of the date of decision.
218. 559 F.2d at 860. The court declined to determine whether those delays constituted
violations of due process of law or the Administrative Procedure Act. Id. at 860 n. 10.
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affirming the district court order requiring payment of benefits, the
court of appeals stated that neither section 405(i)211 nor section
405(q)2 0 of the Social Security Act precludes such payments under
"a federal court's exercise of its remedial power when
it finds that
the Secretary has violated the statute," even though Congress has
not specifically allowed payment of benefits in this situation. 22 '
The court of appeals also reasoned that this order serves the
congressional purpose for the disability insurance benefits program
that persons who are entitled to disability insurance benefits not be
forced, as class representative White was, to seek welfare benefits.
The order was a reasonable exercise of the court's equitable power
in light of the following considerations: (1) the timetable which
triggers payment of benefits to unduly delayed claimants allowed a
one year grace period before the 180 day deadline was mandatory;
(2) the payment order was prospective only and precluded payment
when a delayed decision was the result of action by the claimant or
the need for further medical evidence; and (3) payment terminated
with a right of recoupment if the claimant lost the appeal. The court

concluded that "we find no error in this equitable solution to the
difficult problem of balancing administrative difficulties and wage
'
earners' needs. 222
Other courts have also imposed timetables, but not monetary
sanctions, to speed up delayed administrative action by the Social
Security Administration, 23 the Federal Communications Commis-

sion,

and state agencies determining unemployment compensa-

219. 42 U.S.C. § 405(i) (1973).
220. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1973).
221. 559 F.2d at 860-61.
222. Id. at 860.
223. Caswell v. Califano, 435 F. Supp. 127 (N.D. Me. 1977). In Caswell, the court
imposed timetables on the Social Security Administration to solve the same type of hearing
delay problem challenged in White v. Mathews. The Caswell timetables were to reduce
scheduling delays to no more than 120 days from the date of the request by December 31,
1977, and to no more than 90 days by July 1, 1978, with mandatory compliance reports every
three months until the time limits have been achieved. The court imposed no time limits on
the issuing of decisions so that the Secretary can "give greater attention to the more complex
cases." Id. at 136. The Caswell court rejected imposition of monetary sanctions to ensure
administrative resources would be used to clear up hearing delays. Id. The court cited unpublished decisions of two other district courts: (1) Blankenship v. Mathews, Civ. No. C 75-0185
L(A) (W.D. Ky. May 6, 1976) in which similar timetables were ordered, but in which monetary sanctions were rejected; and (2) Barnett v. Weinberger, sub. nom. Barnett v. Mathews,
Civ. No. 74-720 (D. Vt. opinions of May 5, 1975, January 13, 1976, and February 2, 1976) in
which both timetables and monetary sanctions were ordered. 435 F. Supp. at 129, 136.
224. Nader v. FCC, 520 F.2d 182 (D.C. Cir. 1975). In Nader, the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit ordered the FCC to "within thirty days . . .submit a
schedule for the orderly, expeditious resolution of the lawfulness of the . . ."delayed issues
including "the Commission's proposed timetable for disposing .. " of those issues delayed
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tion claims-

5

The imposition of timetables is indicative of judicial

exasperation with system-wide delay by agencies determining entitlement to social welfare benefits because the consequences of delayed action are drastic for eligible persons who are forced to wait.
The imposition of timetables also promises to be more effective in
relieving system-wide delay than the more traditional remedy of
remanding to the agency which is utilized to protect an individual
litigant from the harmful consequences of a delayed determination
in his or her case.
Courts have also awarded damages to remedy the harm caused
parties because of delayed administrative action. Damages have
2
been awarded under the legal theories of false imprisonment, unlawful detention,2 2 and deprivation of constitutionally protected
rights.22 1 However, the Federal Tort Claims Act cannot be used 29to
action.
award damages because of unreasonably delayed agency
Courts have also dismissed on the merits lawsuits brought by
administrative agencies to enforce the agencies' statutory mandate
when those lawsuits were unreasonably delayed to the prejudice of
ten years. Id. at 207. Both the schedule and any changes to it will require court approval.
The FCC will be required to stick to the schedule and will have to justify "material failures
to comply." Id. The court "shall retain jurisdiction solely to ensure compliance." Id.
225. Phillips v. Dawson, 393 F. Supp. 360 (W.D. Ky. 1975) (timetables imposed by
court for determination of eligibility and for payment of unemployment compensation benefits by Kentucky state agency responsible for unemployment compensation determination);
Wilkinson v. Abrams, 4 Pa. Legis. Serv. Rev. 1 6087 (1976) (court approved timetable required Pennsylvania state agency to decide appeals of unemployment compensation denial
determinations at the "Board of Appeals" level within specified number of days); Howar v.
Smith, 4 Pa. Legis. Serv. Rev. 6087 (1976) (court approved similar timetable for decisions
by referees of initial appeals of denial of unemployment compensation benefits within specified number of days).
226. Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1968) (wrongful detention by sheriff of
prisoner for nine months after criminal charges were dismissed constituted a claim for relief
under state false imprisonment law and a section 1983 civil rights claim because the sheriff
had a statutory duty "to ascertain the authority upon which a prisoner is confined." This he
failed to perform. Id. at 796).
227. Johnson v. Greer, 477 F.2d 101 (5th Cir. 1973) (psychiatric facility administrator
wrongfully delayed, in violation of a statutory duty, obtaining an additional warrant authorizing his continued detention of plaintiff).
228. Slate v. McFetridge, 484 F.2d 1169 (7th Cir. 1973) (court of appeals remanded for
determination of damages, after holding that trial court should have directed a verdict for
plaintiffs, finding constitutional deprivation of plaintiffs' rights when local agency failed to
promptly decide, and failed to promptly notify plaintiffs of its decision on plaintiffs' request
for a-park permit).
229. J.H. Rutter Rex Mfg. Co. v. United States, 515 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1975) cert. denied,
424 U.S. 954 (1976) (discretionary function exception to Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2671 (1976), bars plaintiff's suit under that Act. Plaintiff claimed damages were caused by
the NLRB's unreasonably delayed action in ensuring that plaintiff comply with an order
reinstating employees wrongfully discharged for labor union activity and in computing the
back pay owed to those discharged employees).
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the party sued by the agencies. This remedy has been applied by
courts to litigation brought by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission"e and the Subversive Activities Control Board.2 3' State
courts have similarly remedied delayed administrative adjudication
by reversing orders of administrative agencies suspending a real
estate broker's professional license,2 32 and the driver's license of a
vehicle operator. 2 33 Federal courts, however, have been reluctant to
remedy delayed administrative adjudication by dismissing the
agency proceeding either because the court felt that the appropriate
remedy was remanding the proceeding to the agency for further
action2 34 or because the party claiming delay had foreclosed a dismissal with prejudice by negotiating another favorable disposition
with the agency. 2 35
230. EEOC v. Moore Group, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 1002 (N.D. Ga. 1976) (employer's
motion to dismiss EEOC complaint granted because delays in bringing lawsuit charging
employment discrimination by employer prejudiced employer and therefore violated the
Administrative Procedure Act); Accord, EEOC v. American Nat'l. Bank, 420 F. Supp. 181
(E.D. Va. 1976) (employer's motion for summary judgment dismissing EEOC complaint
granted on grounds of laches and violation of Administrative Procedure Act, § 706); EEOC
v. Bell Helicoptor-Co., 426 F. Supp. 785 (N.D. Tex. 1976) (employer's motion to dismiss
EEOC complaint granted, in part, because EEOC delays violated Administrative Procedure
Act).
231. Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 380
U.S. 513 (1965). In this case, the United States Supreme Court vacated a judgment affirming
an order compelling registration by petitioner as a communist front organization because of
the staleness of the record. The Court noted that the last hearings on the matter were held
in 1954 and the registration claim was based on occurrences happening predominantly before
1940.
232. Commonwealth v. Rinck, 24 Pa. Commw. Ct. 386, 355 A.2d 858 (1976). The court
in Rinck reversed the suspension ordered by the agency and required the agency to reinstate
the broker's license. Id.
233. In re Arndt, 67 N.J. 432, 341 A.2d 596 (1975). The New Jersey Supreme Court
vacated the suspension order in this case.
234. FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 381 U.S. 739 (1965), vacating an order of the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit in Texaco, Inc. v. FTC, 336 F.2d 754 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
The court of appeals had ordered a remand to the FTC to dismiss an antitrust complaint
against Texaco, Inc. when administrative proceedings brought by the FTC lasted 12 years
without the FTC being able to develop a case against Texaco. Id. at 763. The United States
Supreme Court, after vacating the court of appeals order, remanded the case to the FTC for
further proceedings.
235. Brandenfels v. Day, 316 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1963). In this case, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit noted that the unreasonable delay prohibitions
of the Administrative Procedure Act could, under proper circumstances, provide jurisdiction
for a court to compel an agency (here, the Post Office) to dismiss a case with prejudice. In
this case, however, petitioner bargained with the Post Office to dismiss without prejudice a
fraud claim against him as the only alternative to a dismissal with prejudice, either of which
was to his benefit. Although the Post Office had to terminate the initial fraud proceedings
because of procedural irregularities, it could have reinstated the case against petitioner.
Because of the bargain struck between the parties, the court would not compel the Post Office
to dismiss the fraud case with prejudice. Id. at 379-80.
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Courts have also remedied unreasonably delayed agency action
by ordering the agency to enter the delayed decision. Courts have
based this type of relief on either mandamus2 s or the Administrative Procedure Act."3 7 More commonly, however, courts have remedied delayed agency action by remanding the case to the agency
with instructions to decide the case promptly but without necessarily dictating what the agency's decision should be on the merits.
Courts have provided this kind of relief to remedy delayed action
by the Federal Communications Commission, 38 the National Labor
240
Relations Board,2 39 the Environmental Protection Agency, the
236. ICC v. Humboldt S.S. Co., 224 U.S. 474 (1912) (mandamus lies to compel an
agency to take jurisdiction to regulate ship and railroad carriage rates in Alaska, to investigate, and to decide those cases because it has a "ministerial duty" to act under its governing
statute. In Humboldt, the delayed decision the court ordered the agency to implement was
the initial question of whether the ICC had jurisdiction to regulate ship and railroad carriage
rates in the territory of Alaska for transportation of persons and property in interstate commerce). But see Mesa Microwave, Inc. v. FCC, 262 F.2d 723 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (six-month delay
by FCC in processing CATV license applications while a "general inquiry" into the entire
subject of licensing was pending is not such a delay as to justify the requested writ of
mandamus).
237. Arrow Transp. Co. v. United States, 176 F. Supp. 411 (N.D. Ala. 1959), aff'd sub
nom., Kansas Corp. Comm'n v. Arrow Transp. Co., 361 U.S. 353 (1960) (APA compels court
order requiring ICC to set lawful barge traffic rates to relieve barge company from harm
caused by presently effective discriminatory rates). See also Environmental Defense Fund,
Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (court compelled EPA Secretary to issue
cancellation notices as to some uses of DDT pursuant to statutory authority of FIFRA;
petitioners claimed failure to issue notices violated § 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act
and they requested an order analogous to mandamus requiring the issuance of those notices).
238. American Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 191 F.2d 492 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (ten-year delay
by FCC in determining allocation of radio frequencies challenged by American Broadcasting
Co. because of interference with its "clear channel" license caused by the assigning of a
temporary frequency during the ten-year time period to another applicant for a radio station
license; court finds this constitutes agency inaction which it will remedy by remanding case
to FCC and ordering it to promptly decide what frequency to assign to that applicant, radio
station KOB); see Associated Press v. FCC, 448 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (remand with a
court order to the agency to decide the case promptly is the proper remedy when prejudicial
delay is established (which it was not here in an FCC proceeding over AT&T requests for
increases in telpak rates) rather than the court deciding the merits of the claim itself).
239. Templeton v. Dixie Color Printing Co., 444 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 868 (1970) (court of appeals vacated district court order requiring National Labor
Relations Board to hold a decertification election petitioned by certain employees which
election the Board had unlawfully delayed for three years; court of appeals remanded case to
NLRB ordering it to determine promptly whether grounds for a decertification election exist)
see also Clark's Gamble Corp. v. NLRB, 407 F.2d 199 (6th Cir. 1969) (National Labor Relations Board ordered by court to determine, because of the passage of time since the original
collective bargaining representative petition was filed, to what extent the same employees
who originally petitioned are still working there. The determination to be made before requiring the employer to bargain with the originally selected collective bargaining representative
of its employees.
240. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 465 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Environmental Defense Fund challenged refusal by Environmental Protection Agency to suspend
uses of aldrin and dieldrin pursuant to FIFRA; court of appeals remanded case to the agency
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United States Department of Agriculture,2"' the Federal Power
Commission, 22 and the Interstate Commerce Commission.2 43
Courts have used their traditional equitable powers to compel
an agency, by way of a mandatory injunction, to hold a hearing.2 ,
Courts have also indicated that they will enjoin agency action when
a party proves that it will suffer irreparable harm as a result of
delay. 45 Courts will also enjoin the holding of further hearings by a
to review its decision anew based on information provided by its "scientific advisory committee"); accord, in part, Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckleshaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C.
Cir. 1971) (Environmental Defense Fund challenge to refusal of Environmental Protection
Agency to issue notices of suspension for some uses of DDT under FIFRA; court remands case
to agency for a new decision on whether to suspend DDT registration because agency did not
sufficiently state a basis for the initial refusal to suspend).
241. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (Environmental Defense Fund challenge to refusal of Secretary of Agriculture to suspend DDT
registration under FIFRA; court remands case, in part, to Secretary to present to the court a
record of his administrative action, "either for a fresh determination on the question of
suspension, or for a statement of reasons for his silent but effective refusal to suspend the
registration of DDT," Id. at 1100, so that court may properly review the basis of the Secretary's decision).
242. Minneapolis Gas Co. v. FPC, 294 F.2d 212 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (court of appeals
ordered Federal Power Commission to enter a decision in a rate determination case in which
it had held a hearing, heard evidence, made an initial determination, but then ended the rate
proceeding without issuing a formal decision; court indicated Commission could reopen the
case but was not required to do so).
243. North Am. Van Lines, Inc. v. United States, 412 F. Supp. 782 (N.D. Ind. 1976)
(court remands to Interstate Commerce Commission ordering it to promptly decide whether
to grant or deny applications for certificates of convenience and necessity filed by a national
moving company, which decisions the Commission had unlawfully delayed because of a
"flagging procedure" it used).
244. Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Donovan, 274 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1960) (court
of appeals reversed the district court order and remanded holding that the APA empowers a
court to order the Deputy Commissioner under the Longshoreman's Compensation Act to
hold a statutorily required (by the Act itself) hearing to determine (which the Commissioner
refused to do) whether an employer's liability under that Act to an injured employee was
satisfied by the employer's voluntary payment of benefits to the injured worker).
245. M.G. Davis & Co., Inc. v. Cohen, 369 F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 1963). In this case, the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's granting of a motion for
summary judgment filed by the Securities Exchange Commission in a case in which a brokerdealer sought to withdraw its SEC registration and sought injunctive relief preventing the
Commission from investigating it. Id. at 361. The court of appeals noted that injunctive relief
was not available because the broker-dealer had failed to prove that it would be irreparably
harmed by delays in the administrative process if the injunction was not granted. Id. at 363.
The court rejected the broker-dealers assertions that the cost of fighting the investigations
was sufficient to constitute irreparable harm. Id. at 364. Accord, Gulf Oil Corp. v. FPC, 128
F. Supp. 446 (D.D.C. 1955), aff'd, 230 F.2d 40 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 973 (1956)
(injunctive relief could be granted to remedy irreparable harm caused by delayed administrative action; however, no proof of irreparable harm established by plaintiff oil company seeking
to enjoin operation of temporary rates for sales of natural gas arguably not within the jurisdiction of Commission to set even though there were heavy penalties for noncompliance with
temporary rates; therefore injunctive relief denied); International Waste Controls, Inc. v.
SEC, 362 F. Supp. 117 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (claimed economic loss caused by delays in adminis-
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trial examiner pursuant to agency remand in a proceeding previously litigated when the effect of the remand is to unduly delay
those proceedings at great cost in money and time to the objecting
party and when the remanded proceeding would cover issues fully
developed at prior hearings.24 Similarly, courts will modify the orders of administrative agencies when parties who are the subject of
the orders are prejudiced by the order because of delay by the
47
agency in conducting the proceedings which lead to the order.
Prejudicial delay by an administrative agency does not always
entitle the party harmed to relief from that prejudice when the grant
of relief would cause harm to others whose interests are equally
entitled to protection. In National Labor Relations Board v. J. H.
Rutter-Rex Manufacturing Co., Inc.24 the United States Supreme
Court reversed the modification by the Court of Appeals for the
trative proceedings to investigate securities law violations by petitioner was insufficient to
satisfy irreparable harm requirement for granting of injunctive relief halting investigation);
accord, Petroleum Explorations, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 304 U.S. 209 (1938) (cost of
producing evidence at a hearing on natural gas rates which petitioner was ordered to do by
state public utilities commission is insufficient to satisfy irreparable injury requirement for
the granting of injunctive relief prohibiting commission's holding of hearing).
246. Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Johnston, 295 F.2d 856 (4th Cir. 1961) (Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit upheld, in part, granting by district court of injunction prohibiting
National Labor Relations Board regional director from conducting hearings pursuant to
Board remand as to issues previously litigated concerning an unfair labor practice charge;
remand violates Administrative Procedure Act requirement that agencies conduct their business with reasonable dispatch, will further delay ultimate decision, and will result in additional costs of time and money to the objecting party, Deering Milliken, Inc.); a casenote
extensively discussing this case is Note, JudicialAcceleration of the Administrative Process:
The Right to Relief from Unduly ProtractedProceedings,72 YALE L. J. 574 (1963).
247. NLRB v. Superior Fireproof Door & Sash Co., Inc., 289 F.2d 713 (2d Cir. 1961)
(court modified NLRB order which found employer had failed to bargain in good faith with
the collective bargaining representative of its employees; modification allowed because
NLRB took "1,015 days" to complete these proceedings when the average time to complete
such proceedings was "475 days"; modification consisted of ordering NLRB to hold a new
certification election to determine if the previously selected union representative is still
desired by the employees. Id. at 723-24); see C.E. Niehoff & Co. v. FTC, 241 F.2d 37 (7th
Cir. 1957) (court of appeals moc:fied effective date of an FTC cease and desist order entered
against petitioner to stop antitrust law violations; modification changed effective date of the
order from immediately to when ordered by the court on its own or at the request of the FTC;
basis of modification is prejudice to petitioners because its competitors, not yet affected by
similar cease and desist orders but under FTC investigation, will favorably compete with
petitioner on prices and drive it out of business before the FTC can issue cease and desist
orders against those competitors. Id. at 42-43); see Kennedy v. San Francisco-Oakland Newspaper Guild, 430 F.2d 317 (9th Cir. 1970) (court of appeals modified a district court injunctive
order which prevented picketing of striking employees at a newspaper related in corporate
status to the newspaper against whom the strike was called; the modification allowed was
terminating the injunction as to that newspaper, but not as to two unrelated newspapers,
because the NLRB delayed in determining an unfair labor practice claim arising out of the
strike, and the duration of the injunction was tied to the determination of that claim).
248. 396 U.S. 258 (1969).
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Fifth Circuit 49 of a Board back pay award against an employer
reducing the amounts due to employees of the company because the
Board unduly delayed in the "specification process" for determining
who was entitled to what amount of back pay.2 5 In reversing and
thus reinstating the full amount of back pay awarded to the employees by the Board, the court noted that "wronged employees are at
least as much injured by the Board's delay in collecting their back
pay as is the wrongdoing employer." '' Similar protection is provided holders of FCC licenses whose renewal application decisions
22
are unduly delayed by the Commission.
The traditional equitable defense of laches and state statutes
of limitations do not bind the United States government in its pub249. J.H. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 399 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1968).
250. 396 U.S. at 261-62. The Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co. case is one of the longest this writer
has seen. The labor dispute which triggered the litigation commenced with the selection of a
bargaining representative by employees of Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co. in January, 1954. A strike
followed in April, 1954 and lasted for one year. In 1956, the NLRB found that the employer
had unlawfully refused to bargain with the representative and ordered reinstatement of
terminated employees and back pay for those employees. 496 U.S. at 259-60. The Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld the NLRB and enforced the reinstatement and back pay
order in NLRB v. J.H. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., 245 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1957) cited and discussed
in 396 U.S. at 260. Two subsequent court of appeals opinions discussed the employer's delay
claim in NLRB v. J.H. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., 305 F.2d 242 (5th Cir. 1962) and in J.H. RutterRex Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 399 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1968), cited and discussed in 396 U.S. at 26162. The latter opinion was reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court in the instant case. What
may be the final challenge of this company to the back pay award is contained in J. H. Rutter
Rex Mfg. Co. v. United States, 515 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1975) discussed in note 229 supra.
251. 396 U.S. at 264. The court went on to note that "the Board is not required to place
the consequences of its own delay, even if inordinate, upon wronged employees to the benefit
of wrongdoing employers." Id. at 369, citing NLRB v. Electric Cleaner Co., 315 U.S. 685, 689
(1942) and NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 748 n. 16 (1962); see NLRB v. Pool Mfg. Co., 339
U.S. 577, 582 (1950) (NLRB delay in seeking enforcement of a cease and desist order does
not require a court to preclude enforcement of that order); NLRB v. Staub Cleaners, Inc.,
418 F.2d 1086 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1038 (1970) (NLRB delay in both issuing
and seeking enforcement of, inter alia, a refusal to bargain order is not sufficient grounds for
a court to deny enforcement of the order); But see International Union, United Automobile,
Aerospace, & Agricultural Implement Workers v. NLRB, 449 F.2d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1971)
(NLRB request for interim relief requiring employer to collectively bargain with recognized
representative pending completion of the litigation denied by court of appeals, because NLRB
delayed six years in adjudicating case, and because union representatives decided to make
dispute a test case as to "make whole relief").
252. Committee for Open Media v. FCC, 543 F.2d 861 (D.C. Cir. 1976). In this case,
Committee for Open Media challenged the extension of a television station's broadcasting
license (under section 307(d) of the Federal Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 307(d) (1962))
beyond three years from the date of its renewal application, filed in 1970, without the filing
of a new renewal application. In rejecting this challenge because section 307(d) of the Act
automatically extends broadcasting licenses until the Commission makes its renewal decision, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit stated that the purpose of the
extension provision is "to protect licensees from harm associated with delays in agency action
on requests for license renewals." 543 F.2d at 866-67.
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lic capacity.253 Thus, parties harmed by federal administrative agencies that have unreasonably delayed action in the agency's public
25 4
capacity cannot use either laches or state statutes of limitations.
As previously discussed, the federal Administrative Procedure Act
provides an adequate statutory substitute for the protection af55
forded in the defenses of laches or state statutes of limitations.
However, a state administrative agency in Washington was held to
be subject to the defense of equitable estoppel when it delayed ten
25
years in determining the tax assessment of a foreign corporation.
In conclusion, courts have remedied the harm caused by delayed agency action in a variety of ways. Courts have imposed timetables on agencies with monetary sanctions for non-compliance,
have awarded damages, have dismissed agency lawsuits and administrative orders, have ordered the entry of a decision, have remanded
with instructions to promptly decide the case, and have ordered
equitable relief except when other parties would be prejudiced or
when equitable doctrines do not apply. Judicial imposition of these
remedies shows that parties faced with delayed administrative
agency action have a variety of devices to either compel agency
action or to be relieved from the prejudice caused them by the delay.
V.

CONCLUSION

This article has examined jurisdiction, substantive standards,
and remedies for delayed administrative action. A final observation
is that administrative delay cannot be solved by the courts alone.
Both the agencies themselves, and the legislature, whether Congress
253. United States v. Summerlin, 310 U.S. 414, 416 (1940). The United States Supreme
Court in this case stated that "it is well settled that the United States is not bound by state
statutes of limitation or subject to the defense of laches in enforcing its rights." Id., citing
United States v. Thompson, 98 U.S. 486 (1879); see cases cited therein.
254. As to laches, see Chromcraft Corp. v. EEOC, 465 F.2d 745, 746 n.2 (5th Cir. 1972),
citing United States v. Summerlin, 310 U.S. 414 (1940) (laches not raisable as a defense to
challenge unreasonably delayed action by EEOC but § 706 of Administrative Procedure Act
can be used for same challenge); as to state statute of limitations, see EEOC v. Griffin Wheel
Co., 511 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1975) (state statute of limitations does not apply to EEOC when
seeking injunctive relief in public capacity but does apply to EEOC precluding suit when
EEOC is seeking back pay, an essentially private action).
255. See Chromcraft Corp. v. EEOC, 465 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1972) and explanatory
parenthetical in note 254 supra.
256. Conversions & Surveys, Inc., v. Wash. Dept. of Revenue, 11 Wash. App. 127, 521
P.2d 1203 (1974) (appellate court reversed and remanded for a new trial on the issue of
equitable estoppel concluding that if taxpayer could prove on retrial that because of ten-year
delay, which agency conceded was unreasonable, its ability to establish that it was not liable
for taxes assessed was impaired in that "key personnel" no longer worked for taxpayer, then
state would be estopped from collecting assessed tax).
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or a state legislative body, through statutory standards and adequate appropriations, must assist in the resolution of the problem
of administrative delay to insure that justice is timely served.
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